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NAVIGATING THE CONFLUENCE:
SOURCES OF RECONCILIATION FLOWING
BETWEEN THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
BRETT A. MILLER∗
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to identify the confluence of the law
and economics disciplines, using these distinct channels of scholarship
not as an empirical vessel to determine the “value” or “valueless” nature
of water, but rather as a means to reconcile externalities among interested
parties and to identify management strategies that embrace sentiments of
economic efficiency throughout the arena of global hydrocommerce.
The various perspectives on water, particularly with regards to an
increasing global population and demand for freshwater, elicits an
intricate mosaic of tensions concerning the availability, accessibility,
provision, and protection of this fundamental natural resource.
Billions of individuals around the world lack access to basic water
and sanitation services. Despite the prevalence of these atrocities, access
to water is both an individual human right and necessary for human
survival. The legal basis for the human right to water, in terms of
availability, quality, and accessibility, was adopted by the U.N. in its
General Comment No. 15. Despite recognition by the U.N., more than
1.1 billion people do not have sufficient access to clean water, while 2.6
billion people have no provision for sanitation. Against this tragic and
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inexcusable backdrop, the public sector either lacks the financial
resources to provide water or continues to operate water distribution
schemes with undesirable inefficiency. From a pragmatic standpoint—
and to ensure that citizens have access to clean water—there exist
circumstances, both in reality and in the text of the General Comment,
whereupon governments should be compelled, or at least be encouraged,
to solicit capital investment from the private sector in order to construct
adequate water infrastructure and manage water distribution services.
Researchers estimate that over the next twenty years almost $22
trillion (USD) will be necessary to fully modernize global water delivery
and wastewater systems. Water scarcity, an individual’s lack of access to
clean water, arises due to economic and physical constraints, while being
influenced by managerial, institutional, and political factors. At its core,
the primary challenge for nations concerning their respective water
distribution schemes is a lack of adequate financial resources. In
developing countries, an estimated ninety-seven percent of all water
distribution is managed by public-sector suppliers. The inept realities
concerning these water distribution systems in developing countries, and
the fact that over a billion people still lack access to this essential
resource, suggests that governments retain at least some responsibility in
the persistence of the global water crisis. Reconciliation is the next step
in the human right to water argument—from its theoretical origins to its
pragmatic implementation—and may be realized through a law and
economics analysis in support of private-sector participation in the
delivery of water and funding for the provision of adequate
infrastructure. Much like distinct tributaries to a mighty river, the legal
and economic disciplines maintain differences in methodology, scientific
approach, and objectives; but as these disciplines converge, their
tributaries form the river’s main stem, with potential to influence an
entire watershed of jurisprudence.
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I. INTRODUCTION
You can comprehend a piece of river. A whole river . . .
is a thousand differing and not compatible things in-between . . . .
It is also an entity, one of the real wholes, but to feel
the whole is hard because to know it is harder still.1
Enriched with notions of cultural, religious, and biological
significance, the principles of water flow counter to the theoretical
currents of the law and economics analysis.2 The legal and economic
disciplines maintain differences in methodology, scientific approach,
and objectives that converge, much like distinct tributaries to a mighty
river, with potential to influence an entire watershed of jurisprudence.
Despite the seemingly ambitious task of resolving global water issues
at the intersection of law and economics, one potential solution is a
matter of shifting the baseline perspective—similar to the “change of
approach” suggested by R.H. Coase in The Problem of Social Cost.3
Perhaps the economics of water is a matter of perspective, in which a
shifting baseline—from economic value to economic efficiency—could
be beneficial to various sectors within the global water crisis. The law
and economics approach provides a platform to reconcile individual,
social, sovereign, and private-sector perspectives through directed
efforts at improving efficiency, reducing bargaining costs, and
promoting fairness. This approach does not cabin itself into a freemarket advocacy position, nor does it exclusively promote a human
rights perspective. Objectivity is maintained by exploring issues from a
scientific perspective, thereby embracing an ecological approach that
seeks interdisciplinary solutions by recognizing these symbiotic
contradictions.
During the last several decades, the nexus between economic
development, water resources, and human rights has achieved
1. JOHN GRAVES, GOODBYE TO A RIVER 4 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1960).
2. “The river of God is full of water.” Psalm 65:9 (English Standard). The Qur’an further
recognizes the essential nature of water, the following verse being perhaps among the first to
predict water-derived conflicts that would affect desert climates: “[a]nd Allah has sent down rain
from the sky and given life thereby to the earth after its lifelessness. Indeed in that is a sign for a
people who listen.” Qur’an, 16:65 (Sahih International).
3. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1, 42 (1960) [hereinafter
Social Cost]. Coase explained, “[i]n devising and choosing between social arrangements we should
have regard for the total effect. This, above all, is the change in approach which I am advocating.”
Id. at 44.
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prominence as one of the most compelling issues in the global agenda.
Although many distinguished scholars survey these challenges, there
exists an inherent presumption that the right to water and privatesector investment are incompatible. The purpose of this Article is to
identify the confluence of these distinct channels of scholarship, using
law and economics not as an empirical vessel to determine the “value”
or “valueless” nature of water, but rather as a means to reconcile
externalities among interested parties and to identify management
strategies that embrace sentiments of economic efficiency throughout
the global hydrocommerce arena.4 Billions of individuals throughout
the world lack access to basic water and sanitation services—the
prevalence of which is an unfortunate reality that cannot be
understated. To combat this tragedy, the justiciability of the human
right to water continues to develop into an enforceable obligation.5
Countries are obligated to ensure the accessibility and availability of
water to its citizens. These concepts are not a matter of law, economics,
or science. Access to water is an individual right and necessary for
human survival. Against this tragic and inexcusable backdrop, the
public sector nevertheless continues to operate water distribution
schemes with undesirable inefficiency.6 From a pragmatic standpoint,
to ensure that citizens have access to clean water, there exist
circumstances whereupon governments should be compelled, or at
least be encouraged, to solicit private-sector capital investment in

4. Summit Global Management, an investment firm that specializes in “global
hydrocommerce,” describes the sector as follows: “Water—is the most . . . critical industrial input
to the world’s economy . . . water remains absurdly undervalued.” Summit Global Management,
Introduction to Water Investing 2010 2 (2010). On the different values of water: “But exactly how
valuable is water? A truer account would reflect several underlying realities. First, water has no
economic substitute . . . . Second, we can neither create nor destroy water . . . . Third, while we
obviously use more water as the world population grows, we also use more water on a per capita
basis as industrialization, urbanization, and standards of living advance.” Id.
5. See, e.g., Erik B. Bluemel, The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water, 31
ECOLOGY L.Q. 957 (2004) (asserting that “[t]he recognition of a singular right which could satisfy
the entirety of States’ obligations under international law should provide greater clarity and
consistency in interpretation”); Amy Hardberger, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Water:
Evaluating Water as a Human Right and the Duties and Obligations It Creates, 4 NW. J. INT’L HUM.
RTS. 331 (2005) (discussing implications of customary law in the international arena).
6. “In many [developing] countries, a the majority of people still lack access to safe [and
clean] drinking water.” See Hugo Tremblay, A Clash of Paradigms in the Water Sector? Tensions
and Synergies between Integrated Water Resources Management and the Human Rights-Based
Approach to Development, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 307, 319 (2011) (discussing that “[i]n many
countries, the majority of people still lack access to safe drinking water”); see also WORLD
HEALTH ORG. & U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND, PROGRESS ON SANITATION AND DRINKING WATER:
2010 UPDATE 7 (2010) (reporting that “884 million people in the world still do not get their
drinking-water from improved sources”).
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order to construct adequate water infrastructure and manage water
distribution services.7
The provision of water presents numerous challenges to all parties
involved in any particular transaction. When examined through the
lens of law and economics—such as the Coase Theorem and its
transaction cost analysis, or various concepts of economic efficiency
and externalities—this approach maintains an avenue that facilitates
the reconciliation of competing water industry regimes, while
providing individuals with access to these fundamental resources, and
simultaneously creating investment opportunities for the private
sector. This Article does not propose an argument in favor of outright
privatization; rather, it argues that countries should be encouraged to
seek capital investments for water distribution systems and
infrastructure. As a practical matter, this could prove to be the most
efficient way that many countries can even begin to fulfill their
obligations to ensure delivery of the right to water.
In the arena of international law, recognition by the United
Nations (“U.N.”) in 2002 and 2010 of the human right to safe drinking
water and sanitation has propelled the global water crisis to the
forefront of legal scholarship.8 The human right to water leaves states
7. Even in highly developed regions (i.e., United States & Western Europe), governments,
citizens, and private-sector investors benefit from massive investments in water infrastructure, the
total dollar value being in the trillions (USD). See Richard Ashley & Adrian Cashman, The
Impacts of Change on the Long-Term Future Demand for Water Sector Infrastructure, in
INFRASTRUCTURE TO 2030: TELECOM, LAND TRANSPORT, WATER AND ELECTRICITY, ORG.
FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 28,29 (2005); see also WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMME, WATER IN A CHANGING WORLD: THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 3, UNESCO 58 (2009). There are various examples of public-sector and
private-sector management of water utilities, each with successes and failures, throughout the
developed world.
8. Both the U.N. General Assembly and the U.N. Human Rights Council recognized the
human right to safe drinking water and sanitation. See Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ.,
Soc., & Cultural Rights, Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right
to Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights),
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002.11 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment No. 15]; G.A. Res.
64/292 (Aug. 3, 2010); G.A. Res 64/PV.108 (July 28, 2010); Press Release, General Assembly,
General Assembly Adopts Resolution Recognizing Access to Clean Water, Sanitation as Human
Right, By Recorded Vote of 122 in Favour, None Against, 41 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release
GA/10967 (Jul. 28 2010). Enforceability of these rights, on the other hand, remains an important
development in legal scholarship, as discussed infra, Section IV.B. See also Sharmila L. Murthy,
The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning, and the Controversy OverPrivatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 89 (2013); M. Belén Olmos Giupponi and Martha C.
Paz, The Implementation of the Human Right to Water in Argentina and Colombia, XV ANUARIO
MEXICANO DE DER. INTERNACIONAL 323, 326 (2015) (“The enforceability of the right to water
and, in general, of Economic, Cultural and Social Rights is a transnational issue which has been
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with an obligation to ensure its citizens have access to water.
Simultaneously, states that lack the necessary capital are constrained
in providing this right, which is predicated upon maintaining adequate
water distribution systems and infrastructure.9 The lack of sufficient
funding is brutally apparent when considering the billions of people
that lack access to safe drinking water and sanitation.10 Given the vast
funding gap for water infrastructure, public funds alone are likely not
sufficient even in developed countries.11
On the other hand, the markets for global hydrocommerce
continue to suffer from “chronic under-investment” according to
financial institutions.12 Estimates indicate that over the next twenty
years, almost $22 trillion (USD) will be necessary to fully modernize
global water delivery and wastewater systems.13 Currents of economic
efficiency present a unique perspective, however, particularly with
regards to private investment within the project-based realm of the
global water infrastructure industry: a scenario that maintains a system
of efficiency at all levels benefitting governments, individuals, and
third-party investors. Efficiency extends to individuals who otherwise
would not be able to access their right, while also benefitting state
governments, who otherwise could not provide the necessary water
infrastructure, but would then enjoy the indirect economic benefits of
a healthier country over the long-term. In effect, by embracing these
symbiotic contradictions through the lens of law and economics, we
may be in a better position to resolve global water resource challenges.
These paradigms are compatible on a pragmatic level. Based on
the foundation that water is a legal right, an economic approach to
water management becomes essential to the development of legal
raised by prominent scholarship over the past years.”).
9. For sovereign nations, the legal basis for the human right to water is derived from U.N.
state membership and its Covenants, which provide the legal basis for many other human rights.
As of 2016, there are currently 193 U.N. member states, which “[d]ue to the powers vested in its
Charter and its unique international character, the United Nations can take action on the issues
confronting humanity in the 21st century, such as peace and security, climate change, sustainable
development, [and] human rights.” See About the U.N., UNITED NATIONS
http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
10. The externalities surrounding the global water crisis are discussed infra, section III.A.
11. The US Water Sector on the Verge of Transformation 7, ERNST & YOUNG
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Cleantech_Water_Whitepaper/
$FILE/Cleantech-Water-Whitepaper.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2016) [hereinafter US Water Sector
Transformation].
12. 2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, CHARTING OUR WATER FUTURE: ECONOMIC
FRAMEWORKS TO INFORM DECISION-MAKING at 19 (Mike D. Young and Christine Esau, 2009).
13. Leila Boulton, Investing in Blue Gold, FIN. ADVISOR (Jan. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.fa-mag.com/news/investing-in-blue-gold-16511.html.
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regimes that will ensure the accessibility and availability of water.14
Although human rights advocates suggest that water is a social need
and basic necessity of life, managing water from an economics
perspective provides a more comprehensive approach. For example,
an approach that incorporates economics has the capacity to recognize
important variables, such as supply and demand, efficiency of use,
avoiding waste, ecological considerations, and perhaps most
importantly, transaction costs.15 Nevertheless, the following dilemma
represents the riptide between the two competing paradigms,
embracing the challenges that permeate the global water crisis: “While
proponents of participation of the private sector argue that only the
private sector can bring the desperately needed resources to the water
sector, legitimate questions have been raised about the inevitable
increases in tariffs that poor people cannot afford, and that, in turn,
would threaten the concept of the human right to water.”16
“The framing of water and sanitation as a human right can be
understood as an affirmation of the fundamental importance of water
and sanitation for human dignity,” as one scholar describes the
dichotomy, and “as a response to global water service trends that have
increasingly emphasized efficiency, financial sustainability, and
privatization.”17 Although certainly reasonable, this sentiment is a
14. Discussing the water policy relationship between the human rights based approach and
economic management, one scholar described the various perspectives: “[t]his conflict as to
whether water should be viewed as an economic good is not ineluctable but depends on the
context and characteristics of local governance frameworks.” Tremblay, 51 NAT. RES. J. at 330,
supra note 6; see also SALMAN M. A. SALMAN & SIOBHÁN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, WORLD
BANK, THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS 3 (2004),
http://www.ais.unwater.org/ais/pluginfile.php/44/course/section/18/302290PAPER0Human0right
0to0H20.pdf (noting that “the current thinking is that water should not be viewed only as a social
good and a human need, but also as a commodity”).
15. See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD at 3–4, supra note 14 (“Striking a balance
between the two considerations, particularly in light of the expanding role of the private sector in
water resources management on the one hand, and the increasing recognition of the rights of the
poor and vulnerable groups to water on the other, presents a major challenge.”). There are several
distinct economic approaches to water management. For purposes of this discussion, the most
fundamental economic approach “relies on the belief that the efficient allocation of water
resources, measured in economic value, is maximized by markets,” where economic value is an
“apportionment mechanism among different types of utilization and various users based on
marginal costs and benefits.” Tremblay, supra note 6, at 330 –31. Another example, which is often
a source of criticism when discussing economics and water, involves the “tarification of water”
and is “based on accounting principles for costs recovery. . .to ensure sustainability.” Id. (citing
AM. WATER WORKS ASS’N, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RATES, FEES, AND CHARGES (5th ed., 2000)).
16. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 72–73; see also WORLD PANEL
ON FIN. WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, FIN. WATER FOR ALL 3, WORLD WATER COUNCIL (2003).
17. Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning,
and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 89, 90 89 (2013).
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matter of perception, one that does not explicitly analyze the global
water challenge from an economic efficiency perspective, where
neither party is made worse-off by the allocation of resources. By
decoupling the broad strokes of “privatization” from a purely
economic efficiency analysis, it becomes evident that private capital
investment will help fulfill the human right to water while promoting
scenarios where neither bargain party is harmed. In particular, an
efficient outcome may be achieved through the development of
infrastructure projects that ensure actual delivery of the water.18
Perhaps the issue is not a comparison between “bad” and “good.”
Instead, as water economist David Zetland describes, “[p]ublic or
private water service providers fail because they are monopolies, not
because of their profit structure.”19
The distinctions between water, law, and economics are most
apparent in the numerous attempts to reconcile the value of water. In
The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith famously illustrated the different
meanings of value: “The things which have the greatest value in use
have frequently little or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary,
those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently little
or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water; but it will
purchase scarce anything; scarce anything can be had in exchange for
it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value in use . . . .”20 In
contrast, water law scholars incorporate another distinction, and
“categoriz[e] the intrinsic value of water as priceless or even

18. This Article also assumes that distinctions can be drawn in uses of the term “efficiency,”
such that efficient use of water does not mean economic efficiency for purposes of this Article.
That would be too easy to argue that point, but my thoughts are the words have similarities, but
for vastly different reasons, which will be examined in the Article.
19. DAVID ZETLAND, THE END OF ABUNDANCE: ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS TO WATER
SCARCITY 81 (2011). David Zetland is an assistant professor at Leiden University, Netherlands,
where he teaches various classes on economics. He received his PhD in Agricultural and Resource
Economics from University of California-Davis in 2008. He was a S.v. Ciriacy-Wantrup
Postdoctoral Fellow in Natural Resource Economics and Political Economy at University of
California-Berkeley (2008–2010).
20. ADAM SMITH, Of the Origin and Use of Money, in AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES
OF
THE
WEALTH
OF
26,
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/NATIONS
SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf (emphasis added); see also W.M. Hanemann, The Economic
Conception of Water 62–63 in WATER CRISIS: MYTH OR REALITY? (Peter P. Rogers et al. eds.,
2006) (quoting Smith’s “famous[ ] . . . paradox of water and diamonds”).
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incalculable.”21 Whether examined from anthropocentric or ecocentric
perspectives, the inherent value of water remains undeniable.
By navigating around the traditional arguments concerning the
economic “value” of water,22 the course of this Article—through the
braided channels of law and economics23—seeks to harmonize
concepts of the human right to water, as adopted in General Comment
No. 15 by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, with opportunities for private investment in global
hydrocommerce. In the study of ecology, the confluence of two rivers
provides an apparent depiction of conflicting watercourses, much like
the competing concepts of the human right to water and the economics
of water. At least in a hydrological sense, these distinctions are
recognizable, quantifiable, and often pastoral. This new watercourse,
now incorporating the strength of both tributaries within its banks, is
stronger and more productive than its respective tributaries. Here,
through a perspective that integrates analyses rooted in law and
economics, this Article seeks to take the first steps towards reconciling
the human right to water and investment in global hydrocommerce. An
economic analysis of the law provides a platform to use the economists’
approach to analyze functions of a particular legal system.24 On the
premise that there exists a legal and moral obligation to deliver the
human right to water, this discussion builds on legal scholarship,
21. Gabriel Eckstein, Precious, Worthless, or Immeasurable: The Value and Ethic of Water,
38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 963, 963 (2006). Because water is fundamental to human life, as Professor
Eckstein argues, perhaps recognizing the “ethic of water” in relation to the “value of water” will
facilitate cooperation among the multiple of perspectives:
Water ethics reflect the relative importance water plays in people’s lives and provide guidance in
decision making related to the use, management, allocation, and protection of freshwater
resources . . . . One starting point in seeking universal water ethics, however, may be in the fact
that all individuals, communities, nations, and societies value water.
Id. at 968.
22. Water invokes robust feelings, both practically, emotionally, and intellectually, among
all classes of people from across the world. Further complicating the debate, renowned water
scholar Peter Gleick suggests that water is characteristic of both renewable and non-renewable
resources: “[w]ater is largely a renewable resource with rapid flows from one stock and form to
another, and the human use of water typically has no effect on natural recharge rates. But there
are also fixed or isolated stocks of local water resources that are being consumed at rates far faster
than natural rates of renewal.” Peter H. Gleick & Meena Palaniappan, Peak Water Limits to
Freshwater Withdrawal and Use, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11155, 11157 (2010).
23. Some rivers have many small channels that continuously split and join, depending on
different hydrological features, these are called “braided” channels. Similarly, the multidisciplinary approach utilized in this Article is similar to “braided” rivers, both in form, function,
and interconnectivity.
24. See R. H. Coase, Law and Economics and A.W. Brian Simpson, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
103 (1996) (discussing the two separate, but overlapping, parts that comprise law and economics).
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economic research, and basic common sense. Examining these global
water challenges through the lens of economic efficiency and
transaction costs promotes an avenue for reconciliation among all
parties involved. First, by eroding the misperceptions that surround the
alleged moral deficiencies, and second, by identifying an efficient
equilibrium at the confluence of the apparently distinct tributaries of
human rights and economic motivations.
Reconciliation is the next step in arguing for the human right to
water. From its theoretical origins to its pragmatic implementation,
presenting a law and economics analysis supports private-sector
participation in the delivery of water and funding necessary for
adequate infrastructure. Section II details the law and economics
discipline. Section III examines the global water crisis, while Section
IV highlights the legal foundations of the human right to water. Section
V addresses Coasean solutions and explores efficient outcomes.
Finally, Section VI explores potential compatibility between the water
justice movement and private-sector involvement..
II. THE CONFLUENCE OF LAW & ECONOMICS
A. Law & Economics
The field of law and economics, arising from the logical coherence
between these two doctrines, has evolved into an influential discipline
throughout the United States.25 Legal scholarship no longer considers
whether law and economics should be joined—this has already
occurred—but rather, scholars now contemplate the breadth of the
application of economics to the law and legal systems.26 The field of law
and economics provides a platform for the application of economic
analysis to legal issues. The Coase Theorem, recognizing the integral
nature of transaction costs in an economic system, retains seminal
importance within the discipline of law and economics.27 In addition,
concepts of efficiency are employed, as well as an evaluation of the
positive and negative externalities that are present in a given
situation.28
25. See Nuno Garoupa and Thomas S. Ulen, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and
Economics in Europe and the United States, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1555, 1556 (2008) (noting that “[t]he
U.S. legal academy has generously embraced law and economics”). Other “law and” movements
include developments in the fields of law and philosophy, law and sociology, law and science,
empirical legal studies, and feminist jurisprudence, among others. See id. at 1564–65.
26. JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW AND ECONOMICS 5–6 (2008).
27. See generally id. at 81–97.
28. Id. at 59 (incorporating a narrow definition, “an externality occurs when one is harmed
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Within the arena of legal scholarship in the United States, law and
economics is among the fasting growing fields of study.29 From a global
perspective, there is an increasing recognition of the importance of law
and economics, yet this convergence has been at a much slower and
more reserved pace than in the United States.30 Although the
discipline has been accepted in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, legal
scholars suggest that for various reasons, at least internationally, the
influence of law and economics on legal policy and scholarship has
been “overwhelmingly disappointing.”31 Scholars have put forward a
myriad of hypotheses to explain the lack of success for law and
economics outside the United States, including: legal tradition (e.g.,
civil law vs. common law);32 language barriers; misperceived influence
of ideology (liberal or conservative) on legal philosophy within foreign
legal scholarship;33 and perhaps the most comprehensive of all reasons,
legal parochialism.34
Hesitation throughout the international legal community to
incorporate the field of law and economics simultaneously presents a

or benefitted by the actions of another and there is no offsetting payment.”).
29. Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1316–17 (2002)
(noting that law and economics was one “of the external approaches that began to take hold in
the legal academy around 1970”).
30. Nuno Garoupa, The Law and Economics of Legal Parochialism, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV.
1517, 1518 (2011) (noting that law and economics “is virtually ignored by courts” outside of the
United States and Israel).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and
Developing Nations, 17 RATIO JURIS 66, 77 (2004) (asserting that common-law judges embrace
law and economics in part because they are “appointed from the practice of law,” making them
“more worldly than their counterparts in the career judiciaries of civilian legal systems.”); Richard
A. Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
3, 4–5 (1997) (explaining cultural differences under continental Europe’s civil law system).
33. Garoupa, supra note 30, at 1519–20. With particular regards to the topics discussed
herein and the development of a harmonic balance between the legal right to water and economic
analyses, Professor Garoupa’s historical analysis of law and economics in Europe offers
interesting insight into these challenges.
We should acknowledge that legal scholars in Europe show an intense dislike for efficiency and
seem to be much more open to social justice or redistributive legal arguments. Chronologically,
however, the distaste for efficiency seems to have been revealed when confronted with law and
economics. Therefore, it is unclear whether law and economics has been rejected because legal
scholars dislike efficiency, or efficiency is disliked because legal scholars rejected law and
economics.
Id. at 1520. Nevertheless, this underscores the potential significance of this
Article, which provides an economic analysis in support of the legal right to water on a global
scale.
34. Id. at 1525 (defining legal parochialism as a “form of trade protectionism in the context
of the market for legal ideas”).
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unique opportunity for scholarship seeking to analyze foreign legal
regimes from an economics perspective. The legal right to water
continues to evolve as an international establishment, and because the
field of law and economics has gained worldwide influence at a slower
pace—this approach is among the first to both analyze and support the
human right to water from an economics perspective.
B. The Coase Theorem & Transaction Costs
The legacy of Professor Ronald Coase is embedded within his
substantial contributions to the subject of law and economics,35
including the concepts of transaction costs and associated limits of
firms in The Nature of the Firm (1937).36 Coase famously established
the notion that externalities could be overcome by well-defined
property rights in The Problem of Social Cost (1960).37 Coase maintains
his significance because of the pragmatic perspectives that are derived
from his problem-solving approach and desire to identify efficient
outcomes within the scope of real world challenges.38 The roots of his
scholarship, at least chronologically, were influenced by an Economics
of Public Utilities course that he was assigned to teach as an Assistant
Lecturer at the London School of Economics in 1935.
While researching “historical studies of the water, gas, and
electricity supply industries,” Coase found that little was known about
British public utilities.39 Most applicable to the discussion set forth
herein, (which favors private-sector involvement in the delivery of the
right to water, as opposed to countries that rely solely on the public
sector) Coase described what he learned about water utilities: “These
researches taught me much about the public utility industries and they

35. See David D. Haddock, Fred S. McChesney & Menahem Spiegel, An Ordinary
Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990) (describing
the Coase Theorem as the basis for virtually all law and economics theory).
36. For much of his life and beginning in 1964, Ronald H. Coase was the Clifton R. Musser
Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Chicago Law School. Professor Coase was
the editor of the Journal of Law and Economics from 1964–1982. He received the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1991. See RONALD COASE INST., About Ronald Coase,
https://coase.org/aboutronaldcoase.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2016).
37. See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3.
38. In describing his views on governmental involvement in the economy, Coase offered
insight into his approach, which rather than being theoretical, was predominantly based on
practical analyses: “[m]y views on government intervention in the economy have changed over
my life, but they have always been driven by factual investigations.” Coase, Law and Economics
and A.W. Brian Simpson, supra note 24, at 108.
39. Id. at 106. This research was interrupted by World War II, when Coase joined the Civil
Service. Id. at 106–07.
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certainly made me aware of the defects of government operation of
these industries, whether municipal or through nationalization.”40
Although the extent to which these studies influenced his later
scholarship is uncertain, the fact that his academic career began with
research on water and other utilities suggests that Coase is relevant to
a discussion concerning the obligation of governments to deliver the
human right to water.
The Coase Theorem is fundamental to any law and economics
analysis, as The Problem of Social Cost is among the most cited articles
within the discipline.41 Before the Coase Theorem became the
formative doctrine among economists, Pigouvian taxes were the
preferred remedy to restore efficiency and alleviate the effects of
externalities.42 Coase’s argument fundamentally shifted the prevailing
views among economists.43 The applicability of the Coase Theorem
incorporates the nature of transaction costs.44 Transaction costs are
those derived from the creation of the bargain. When there are no
transaction costs, the Coase Theorem applies and the legal system in
question necessarily achieves its desirable outcome. This outcome is an
efficient equilibrium. The Coase Theorem advanced several significant
notions with regards to the law and economics analysis: the application
of Pigouvian taxes to remedy negative externalities does not always
lead to an efficient result; the existence of externalities does not
necessarily lead to an inefficient result; and most importantly, the focus
should be on transaction costs, not necessarily externalities.45
At its core, the Coase Theorem provides that the primary
objective is to reach the most efficient allocation of resources (e.g., and
for purposes of this article, access to water) with limited judicial and
governmental involvement.46 Coase argued that as long as property
rights are well defined and the parties enter a bargain without
transaction costs, the market system will efficiently alleviate the effects
40. Id. at 106.
41. See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3.
42. For an explanation of this methodology, see generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE (1932).
43. See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3.
44. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 12–13 (4th ed.
2011) (explaining the Coase Theorem).
45. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 82; see also David Friedman, The Swedes
Get It Right, http://daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/The_Swedes.html (last visited Sept. 17,
2017).
46. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3, at 13 (“If we are to attain an optimum allocation of
resources, it is therefore desirable that both parties should take the harmful effect (the nuisance)
into account in deciding on their course of action.”).
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of externalities.47 An efficient outcome, and thus an efficient allocation
of resources, requires that the transaction costs be less than the benefits
each party will receive.48 From a Coasean perspective, these
transaction costs must be low (or at zero) to incentivize activity and
achieve an economically efficient right allocation.49 Otherwise, when
transaction costs are too high, parties may never achieve “this optimal
arrangement of rights.”50
The Coase Theorem, and its concept of transaction costs, is
relevant to the discussion concerning whether an efficient equilibrium
can be achieved by including the private sector in facilitating the
delivery of the human right to water. According to some legal scholars,
the reality is that transaction costs are almost never zero and are often
substantial.51 As discussed infra in Section V, various transaction costs
and externalities exist among the private sector, governments, and
individuals within the global hydrocommerce arena. Determinations
regarding the applicability of the Coase Theorem must be considered
on a case-by-case basis. To address these complexities, this Article will
consider the risks, incentives, and reduction of externalities, both in the
case of private-sector involvement and without, to examine various
approaches (and their alternatives) that can lead to an economically
efficient allocation of resources.
C. Principles of Economic Efficiency
In an efficient economic system, goods worth more than they cost
to produce get produced, while goods worth less than they cost to
produce do not.52 Externalities and their associated effects complicate
the system, leading to inefficient outcomes and limited production. As
the original baseline standard of efficiency, Pareto efficiency is often
incorporated into the law and economics analysis.53 At its core, Pareto
efficiency examines various allocations of resources and the

47. See Friedman, supra note 45 (“If transaction costs are zero—if in other words, any
agreement that is to the mutual benefit of the parties concerned gets made—then any initial
definition of property rights leads to an efficient outcome.”).
48. See Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3, at 15 (explaining that, even if transactions are
costless, rights will be rearranged “if it would lead to an increase in the value of production”).
49. Id. at 15–16.
50. Id. at 16.
51. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 98; see also Friedman, supra note 45.
52. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 82.
53. The Pareto concept of economic efficiency is credited to Italian economist and engineer
Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923). SEAN INGHAM, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, PARETO-OPTIMALITY,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pareto-optimality (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).
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corresponding societal impact if those allocations are altered. When an
alteration can be made that makes at least one person better off and
no person worse off, then this efficient outcome is Pareto superior.54 In
contrast, an alteration that leaves at least one person worse off is Pareto
inferior, disregarding any beneficial effects to other parties.55 An
allocation is considered Pareto efficient or optimal when no change can
be made without making at least one person worse off.56
Pareto efficiency is important because these benefits or detriments
are not weighed against each other. It is difficult to orchestrate legal or
policy regimes with universal agreement—where all parties benefit and
none are disadvantaged. Although some scholars have suggested that
the standard of Pareto efficiency is confined to certain situations and
limited in its applicability,57 this Article’s analysis is significant because
it may broaden the scope of this applicability, such that Pareto
efficiency may be apparent within the relationship between the human
right to water and global hydrocommerce. Multiple parties will be
evaluated in the subsequent economic analysis, which evaluates legal
regimes that create an obligation for states to seek private-sector
involvement to ensure the provision of the human right to water for its
citizens. For the sake of this macro-level analysis, the relevant parties
include individuals receiving the right to water, governments with an
obligation to provide this right to water to the citizens of the state, and
private-sector investors seeking to profit within the lucrative global
market.
One alternative to the efficiency considered within the purview of
the Coase Theorem is the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which is essentially
a standard of wealth maximization.58 This concept of efficiency is often
relied upon by economists in analyzing legal regimes from an economic
perspective.59 In terms of wealth maximization, the Kaldor-Hicks
standard of efficiency ensures that resources end up in the possession
of those who value the resources most, irrespective of the voluntary
exchange of compensation. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is different than
Pareto efficiency because Pareto efficiency concepts rely on
“interpersonal comparisons of utility,” which may be unscientific and

54. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 27
55. Id.
56. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 26–27; see also POLINSKY, supra note 44, at
7–9.
57. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 28–29.
58. Id. at 28.
59. Id.
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arbitrary in comparison to units of “wealth” and “value.”60 Economists
realized utility comparisons among buyers and sellers is quantitatively
impractical because utility refers to the psychological satisfaction of the
parties. In contrast, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency provided an acceptable
substitute because wealth maximization is expressed as a “willingness
or ability to pay.”61 This concept is imperfect, particularly in its
applicability to the right to water as a legal regime, because a
consequence of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is that “those who cannot pay
for something, even though they might derive great utility from it, will
not be regarded as valuing it.”62
Externalities must also be examined, particularly in situations
where the Coase Thereom may lack applicability. An externality
occurs when one is harmed or benefited by the actions of another and
there is no offsetting payment.63 For example, air and water pollution
are externalities that result from market failure. No party can offer it
for sale, and no corresponding party can acquire it for production
purposes.64 The scope of externalities can affect individuals by reducing
their respective utility in a way beyond their control, as well as firms,
by affecting production in a positive or negative manner.65 When only
two parties are involved, it is likely easier to achieve a solution that
addresses the externalities. In contrast, when numerous individuals,
nations, and private-sector representatives are involved—as is the case
with legal regimes that provide the right to water—it becomes
exponentially more challenging to address the prevailing externalities.
The applicability of these law and economics concepts, namely
Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, and externalities, are
essential to the analysis. They address whether the most efficient
regime in the provision of the right to water is through private-sector
involvement or if alternatives should also be considered from a law and
economics perspective.
D. Water Law & Economics
The application of economic analyses within the realm of water
law jurisprudence has garnered increasing recognition among legal

60. Id. at 29–30.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 31.
63. Id. at 59.
64. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 446 (2002) (describing
pollution as an example of a negative externality).
65. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 26, at 64–65.
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scholars and law review publications in the United States.66 Building on
this scholarship, this Article is unique in its application of economics
analyses to internationally recognized human rights, rather than a
national (i.e., domestic) legal regime.67 Water management
institutions, such as the Integrated Water Resources Management,
often reference economic efficiency as a relevant factor within
successful regimes. Much of the legal scholarship, however, focuses on
supply and demand, waste, and the economic “value” of water. Most
importantly, there has been limited scholarship that applies the
economic concepts of efficiency (i.e., Pareto, Kaldor-Hicks) “the
human rights to water.”
In American legal scholarship, economic principles intersect with
concepts of water law primarily in the water markets discussion. Within
the market system, voluntary transfers would occur between willing
sellers and buyers who decide what the water is worth to each of them.68
From an economics perspective, embracing the market system would
“facilitate the movement of water from low-value activities to higher
value ones,” thereby promoting efficiency by decreasing waste.69
Nevertheless, although the potential benefits of water markets may be
significant in various regions and circumstances, this approach may not
fully address the underlying global water crisis. How can an individual
who lacks basic access to water begin to bargain or negotiate with

66. See Aaron Culp, Comment, Water Can Be for Drinking Again: Economic and
Collaborative Solutions to a Texas Water Fight, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 103, 110–13 (using economic
analyses including the Coase Theorem, as well as Calabresi and Melamed’s “Cathedral” model,
to examine a water rights conflict in Texas between downstream rice farmers and upstream
domestic water users in the Highland Lakes Region and City of Austin). See also Guido Calbresi
& Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1107 (1972) (exploring transaction cost issues derived from
“holdouts”). For an application of Coasean principles to water law, see generally Sarah P.
Hollinshead, Water Is Not Liquid: Securitization, Transaction Costs, and California’s Water
Market, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323 (2008), and C. Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorem and
Western U.S. Appropriative Water Rights, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 169 (2005). Ruml analyzed the
legal and pragmatic obstacles to water transfers to demonstrate that the prior appropriation
regime did not achieve the Coase equilibria because “transaction costs [were] high and title to
water rights [was] insecure.” Id. at 182.
67. Although law review articles have explored, or at least acknowledged, the interactions
between economic efficiency and the right to water, see, e.g., Tremblay, supra note 6, at 309, none
have offered a thorough examination of these symbiotic contradictions from an economics and
the law perspective.
68. See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873,
1884 (2005); see also Robert Glennon, The Price of Water, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
337, 339 (2004) (exploring “the voluntary transfer of water between water users” as a potential
option for addressing our increasing use of water).
69. Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, supra note 68, at 1884.
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another party within a water market transaction? Moreover, what is
the value of water if your country lacks the basic distribution systems
and infrastructure to even deliver this resource?
III. THE WORLD’S MOST “FUNDAMENTAL” RESOURCE
A. Global Water Crisis
Throughout the history of mankind, the importance of water has
remained constant because there is simply no substitute for water.
More importantly, water is a “prerequisite for the realization of other
human rights.”70 Despite the essential nature of this resource, “more
than [two] billion people are affected by water shortages in over forty
countries.”71 1.1 billion people do not have sufficient access to clean
and safe water, while 2.6 billion people have no provisions for
sanitation.72 These proportions are staggering in a world of almost 7.5
billion individuals. Even more alarming, an estimated 1.4 million
children under the age of five die every year due to lack of clean water
and adequate sanitation.73 For instance, in the African countries of
Nigeria and Cameroon, the increased use of unprotected water sources
for drinking purposes is directly associated with an increase child
mortality rates.74
Renowned scientist Peter Gleick describes the failure to provide
individuals with affordable and reliable access to clean water and
sanitation as one of humankind’s greatest failings.78 These statistics are
exacerbated by the increasing global population, which has more than
tripled in the last century. This corresponds with an increasing demand
70. General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 1.
71. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 1.
72. Michael D. Young, Investing in Water Services Infrastructure Polices and Management
3, in INVESTING IN WATER FOR A GREEN ECONOMY: SERVICES, INFRASTRUCTURE, POLICIES,
AND MANAGEMENT (Mike D. Young & Christine Esau eds., 2013); see also FREDRIK
SEGERFELDT, WATER FOR SALE: HOW BUSINESS AND THE MARKET CAN RESOLVE THE
WORLD’S WATER CRISIS 1, CATO INST. (2005); UN-Water Global Annual Assessment of
Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS) 2010: Targeting Resources for Better Results, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION (2010), www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/glaas/en/ (last visited
Sept. 28, 2017).
73. Young, supra note 72, at 3, 9. At this rate, an estimated 3,900 children under 5 years old
die per day because of lack of access to clean water and sanitation. Id. at 9; see also UNICEF,
STATE OF THE WORLD’S CHILDREN 2005 (2004).
74. See John Ward et al., Challenging Hydrological Panaceas: Evidence from the Niger River
Basin at 177, in INVESTING IN WATER FOR A GREEN ECONOMY: SERVICES, INFRASTRUCTURE,
POLICIES, AND MANAGEMENT (Mike D. Young & Christine Esau eds., 2013).
78
See PETER H. GLEICK, THE WORLD’S WATER 2008–2009: THE BIENNIAL REPORT ON
FRESHWATER RESOURCES (2009).
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for water, further straining the finite supply of this natural resource.
Throughout this same timeframe, water uses for human purposes have
multiplied at a six-fold rate.75 The gravity of these adverse impacts is
resounding, with widespread implications for countries and their
citizens.
Although the difficulty in providing individuals with clean water
and sanitation exists in various degrees—each uniquely affected at
regional-levels by socio-economics, aridity, development, and climate,
among other factors76—the inability to ensure the provision of water
occurs throughout the world. Many countries have failed to provide
even the most basic water industry services. In fact, most countries in
Africa, large areas of central Asia, and countries such as China, India,
Peru, and Bolivia cannot provide many of their citizens with access to
clean water or sanitation.77 According to Australian water economist
Michael D. Young, “[t]he existing inadequacies in provision of water
and sanitation services generate considerable social costs and
economic inefficiencies.”78 The various perspectives on water, in
connection with the increasing global population and demand for
freshwater, creates an intricate mosaic of tensions concerning the
availability, accessibility, provision, and protection of this fundamental
natural resource.79
1.

Government Failure and Inefficiency in the Delivery of Water

Water scarcity—an individual’s lack of access to clean water—
arises due to economic and physical constraints, while being influenced
by managerial, institutional, and political factors.80 The primary
75. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 1 (citing WILLIAM J. COSGROVE
& FRANK R. RIJSBERMAN, WORLD WATER COUNCIL, WORLD WATER VISION—MAKING
WATER EVERYBODY’S BUSINESS 4 (Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2000)).
76. See, e.g., Arab Water Council, Vulnerability of Arid and Semi-Arid Regions to Climate
Change,
PERSPECTIVES ON
WATER AND CLIMATE
CHANGE
ADAPTATION,
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/Publications_and_reports/Climate_Ch
ange/PersPap_09._Arid_and_Semi-Arid_Regions.pdf. (last visited Sept. 28, 2017).
77. See Charles J. Vorosmarty et al., Global Threats to Human Water Security and River
Biodiversity, 467 NATURE 555, 556–61 (2010) (quantifying stressors affecting surface water
resources and analyzing policy and management responses to water security and biodiversity
threats over a range of scales, “from global to local”); see generally JOINT MONITORING
PROGRAMME ON WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION, WORLD HEALTH ORG./UNICEF,
PROGRESS ON SANITATION AND DRINKING-WATER: 2010 UPDATE (2010).
78. Young, supra note 72, at 3.
79. See generally Eckstein, supra note 21, at 964.
80. See Ward et al., supra note 74, at 177–78; see also Francois Molle & Peter Mollinga,
Water Policy Indicators: Conceptual Problems and Policy Issues, 5 WATER POLICY 529, 531
(2003).
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challenge faced by states concerning their respective water distribution
schemes is a lack of adequate financial resources. In developing
countries, an estimated ninety-seven percent of all water distribution is
managed by public-sector suppliers.81 In these same developing
countries, more than a billion individuals are deprived of access to
water.82 The realities concerning these water distribution systems in
developing countries, and the fact that over a billion people still lack
access to this resource, suggests that governments retain at least some
responsibility in the persistence of the global water crisis.
Multiple externalities permeate water utilities that are controlled
and operated by the public sector (i.e., government
management/funding regimes). These externalities may come from the
motivations of politicians and trade unions, which are often driven by
self-interest as opposed to the greater welfare of society. The problem
with these individual government-actors may actually be a lack of
motivation, at least in terms of ensuring the delivery of water to
citizens. These systems often become inefficient, as the bureaucracies
preserve the failing status quo. Government utilities in developing
countries must deal with intermittent power supplies, lack of
regulations, poorly educated staff, and bureaucratic demands, leading
to an environment of complacency and corruption.83 In comparison,
the private sector maintains different motivations, benefitting from a
range of factors, including more robust financial resources, specialized
expertise in water distribution, experience with corporate operations,
access to innovative technology, cost-awareness, and incentive-based
structures.84 The billions of people lacking access to water suggests that
public-sector utilities are not often successful in the provision of water,
at least not in a capacity that features sole management authority.
Further, the frequency of these critical circumstances is indicative of a
prevailing trend where the public sector lacks the requisite financial
resources to efficiently manage their water distribution systems.
Governments are affected by numerous other factors. Publicsector utilities may be operating in serious debt, overstaffed by
politically connected individuals, and understaffed by individuals that
have the appropriate expertise. The public sector operational structure
often relies on bureaucrats, while placing too little emphasis on
engineers, economists, and hydrologists. Political concerns are
81.
82.
83.
84.

SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 1.
Id.
ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 155.
See SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 59–62.
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pervasive in the public sector, which can result in monopoly-type
regimes that inevitably fail.85 These inefficiencies lead to coverage
issues for citizens, in which government utilities cannot supply water to
its whole distribution network throughout the entire twenty-four hour
day. For example, before the Philippine government privatized its
water sector, the government agency could only supply water for
seventeen hours per day, and even this was limited to two-thirds of the
utilities coverage.86
Despite the alarming nature of these statistics regarding publicsector failures in the water industry, this should not be considered a
reason to presume that private-sector participation in water delivery
and infrastructure is an automatic, fail-safe solution. It is true that the
private sector participation in this complex industry has also
contributed to the failure of certain water delivery regimes.
Nevertheless, as this Article contemplates through the law and
economics analysis, this suggests that we must examine the current
status of global water delivery regimes and acknowledge that the public
sector may not be best suited to handle these responsibilities, at least
not as sole management authority in some situations.
2.

Private-Sector Participation in Water Distribution Regimes

By the 1990s, the breadth of the global water crisis led many
governments in developing countries to seek private-sector
participation in more than 100 water and sewerage projects.87 Although
the degree of participation may be considered controversial (e.g.,
complete privatization vs. public-private partnerships), there is
optimism throughout the global water industry that private-sector

85. ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 88–90.
86. See Tanya Kapoor, Is Successful Water Privatization a Pipe Dream?: An Analysis of
Three Global Case Studies, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 157, 178–79 (2015).
87. See George R.G. Clarke, Katrina Kosec & Scott Wallsten, Has Private Participation in
Water and Sewerage Improved Coverage? Empirical Evidence From Latin America, 21 J. INT’L.
DEV. 327, 328 (2009). According to some international commentators, concepts of efficiency were
central to the private sector’s increased involvement in the development of services and
infrastructure:
In the 1980s, the neoliberal agenda shifted the focus of development efforts from economic
growth with equity towards efficiency and the productive allocation of resources. Around this
time, private sector participation in previously state run enterprises. . .was particularly
encouraged. Essentially, a ‘tidal wave of privatization’ was unleashed with private actors taking
over the delivery of services related to social welfare, health care, water, gas, electricity, and so
on.
Anna F.S. Russell, Incorporating Social Rights in Development: Transnational Corporations and
the Right to Water, 7 INT’L. J. L. IN CONT. 1, 1 (2011).
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involvement will maintain a significant role in the delivery of water and
development of adequate infrastructure. Participation by the private
sector within the realm of the global water industry has encountered
both successes and failures.88 However, many case studies,
commentaries, and media coverage focus on the most extreme
examples.89 More generally, the comparison of water-utility
performances before and after privatization does not address whether
the result would have been different in the absence of such
privatization reforms.90 It is difficult to make these estimates with
certainty, at least from a quantitative perspective. Thus, some
researchers suggest that empirical deficiencies may reside within case
studies comparing successes and failures.91
Although the private sector has experienced failures in the water
industry, there are also many successful examples of private
investments that improve water distribution in developing countries.
Most notably, in the Philippines, after the private sector obtained
management control of the water distribution system in Manila, the
results were the delivery of water to millions of citizens that were not
previously served by the public, government-controlled utility.92 The
Manila Water Company has served residents for over fifteen years and
is now listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange.93 By 2006, ninety-nine
percent of Manila Water Company’s distribution network had twentyfour hour access to water.94 Even when rates increased, the private
sector instituted programs to ensure that residents in the poorest
neighborhoods paid below the price charged to other customers.95
Although there are many examples of private-sector participation,
media sensationalism suggests that news coverage will focus on the
most controversial and disastrous events. Thus, the press is more likely
to cover events similar to the protests in Cochabamba, Bolivia, after
the water concession contract was revoked, rather than a moderately

88. See Clarke et al., supra note 87, at 328. ]
89. Id.
90. Id. at 328–30.
91. Id. at 328.
92. See SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 2; see also Xun Wu & Nepomuceno A. Malaluan, A
Tale of Two Concessionaires: A Natural Experiment of Water Privatization in Metro Manila, 45
URB. STUD. 207, 213–17 (2008).
93. See Kapoor, supra note 86, at 178. In the year of its IPO (2005), Asia Money voted
Manila Water Company the “best managed small cap company.” See id. at n.262.
94. See id. at 181.
95. See id. at 183.

Miller Final (Do Not Delete)

128

2/15/2018 5:31 PM

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXVIII:105

successful example of private-sector participation.96 Some
commentators suggest that empirical studies of the success of privatesector participation may also retain this sample selection bias.97 Many
critiques of private-sector involvement focus on absolute privatization
regimes, rather than capital investments in local or regional water
infrastructure projects. For example, one commentator suggests that
“water privatization programs are highly unlikely to deliver Pareto
improvements if privatizers charge impoverished and wealthy
populations the prevailing market rate,” instead proposing that they
should allow progressive pricing.98 The resulting negotiations and
transaction costs will almost certainly be different if the private
company is seeking full privatization of the water industry through
concession contracts, as opposed to investments in water infrastructure
projects and similar management contracts.
In general, it is true that all types of water services regimes have
been met with varying degrees of success and failure.99 For purposes of
this Article, it is important to consider that the various types and
degrees of private-sector participation may affect water distribution
systems and coverage differently. For example, concession contracts
represent absolute privatization and may invite substantial private
investment.100 Lease and management contracts also invite privatesector investment.101 In some instances, loans from international
donors such as the World Bank provided the financial resources to
expand the water sector; commentators suggest that due to the poor
performance of public utilities, countries would not have received the

96. See infra Section IV for more thorough discussion on the events in Cochabamba, Bolivia
and the implications for future private-sector involvement. In summary, Bolivia allowed private
sector participation in the water and sewerage sectors. In 1999, the Cochabamba government
signed a 40-year concession agreement, but after higher tariffs resulted in civil unrest, the
agreement was cancelled five months later. Id. at 340.
97. See Clarke et al., supra note 87, at 328–29.
98. Kapoor, supra note 86, at 159–60 (critiquing “development banks’ privatization policies
by analyzing water privatizations in Bolivia, South Africa, and the Philippines”).
99. The three general types of water service utilities include the public sector, the private
sector, and public-private partnerships. ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 86–98.
100. Concession contracts “give private company a license to run the water system and charge
customers to make a profit. The private company is responsible for all investments, including
building new pipes and sewers to connect households.” MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARK, BLUE
GOLD: THE FIGHT TO STOP THE CORPORATE THEFT OF THE WORLD’S WATER 39 (2002).
101. Leases are “contracts under which the company is responsible for running the
distribution system and for making the investments necessary to repair and renew the existing
assets, but the local government remains responsible for new investment.” Management contracts
“make the private company responsible only for managing the water service but not for any
investments.” Id. at 39.
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financing without private-sector participation.102 Although a detailed
analysis of these levels of involvement may be an entirely different
discussion, the overarching approach should be to examine effects on
a case-by-case basis, rather than making general assumptions.
B. Blue Gold: Investment in the Global Water Industry
The business of water, particularly investment opportunities
within the realm of water distribution, is linked to infrastructure gaps,
treatment methodologies, water industry sectors, regulatory
requirements, and the practical needs for emerging countries, among
many other sub-disciplines and related sectors.103 The costs associated
with the provision of clean water are inextricably linked to these same
factors. Resource economist Steve Hoffman best described the
prospects of entering the global water industry from an investor’s
perspective, “Any time there is a structural change in an industry
caused by shifts in the economic fundamentals, there is a huge potential
for corresponding economic gain…creat[ing] the unprecedented
investment opportunity of the twenty-first century—the business of
water.”104 This remarkable statistic broadly represents the cost of
providing access to water and adequate sanitation, either through
construction of new infrastructure or to maintain existing water
delivery services.
Even in developed countries, the costs to operate, maintain,
monitor, and replace existing infrastructure are quite staggering,
annually approaching hundreds of billions of dollars (USD). Reports
also suggest that only three percent of impoverished citizens in the
developing world are provided water by private-sector utilities.105
Among these developing countries, private-sector participation in
water distribution has been limited. This presents a host of challenges
and opportunities: At least $180 billion is required annually to ensure
the universal delivery of water to citizens of the Third World.106
Because water utilities directly provide water to the user, they play a
substantial role in ensuring an individual’s human right to water.

102. Clarke et al., supra note 87, at 334–35. Countries that received World Bank financed
loans for water sector projects include Guinea and Colombia (specifically the city of Cartagena)
Id. at 8.
103. Id. at 41.
104. STEVE HOFFMAN, PLANET WATER: INVESTING IN THE WORLD’S MOST VALUABLE
RESOURCE 49 (2009).
105. SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 2–4.
106. Id.
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Although the business of water remains integrated as a whole, the
industry can be characterized by various sectors including: water
utilities, infrastructure, treatment, and resource management. Despite
differences concerning their respective investment characteristics, each
sector is immediately relevant to the delivery of the resource, and
equally relevant to fulfilling the right to water in terms of accessibility,
availability, quantity, and quality. The water infrastructure sector
constructs, replaces, repairs, and monitors the water distribution
systems, including vast networks of pipelines, pumps, storage facilities,
and other mechanisms in the system.107 The nature of water
distribution
provides
strategic
investment
opportunities:
“[i]nternational markets for new infrastructure construction in
emerging economies add significantly to the magnitude of the potential
expenditures.”108 The water and wastewater treatment sector also
provides opportunities for investors intrigued by technological
developments in the use, reuse, or discharge of water, processes which
could include equipment, chemicals, filtration, or disinfection.
Desalination is another exciting investment technology, a technique
that has experienced significant growth over the last decade.109
Management efforts traditionally focused on increasing water
supplies and access to these supplies, allowing private capital
investments for the construction of dams and impoundments, as well
as other large-scale infrastructure projects.110 Nevertheless, the
demand for water continues to increase, intensified by urbanization,
agricultural development, industrial development, climate change, and
pollution.111 These factors have further created investment
opportunities within global water management, so scarcity concerns
107. HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 57.
108. Id. In the United States, the EPA estimates that the total costs to repair the existing
water and wastewater infrastructure will approach $1 trillion over the next several decades. Id.
109. See Isabel Kershner, Aided by the Sea, Israel Overcomes an Old Foe: Drought, N.Y.
TIMES (May 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/30/world/middleeast/water-revolutionin-israel-overcomes-any-threat-of-drought.html?_r=0.
110. See Murthy, supra note 17, at 95. Turkey’s Southeastern Anatolia Project (“GAP”), a
development project to build a series of dams and hydroelectric plants along the Tigris and
Euphrates Rivers in the southeastern part of Turkey. The project will take 30 years to complete
and is estimated to cost $32 billion. This project is expected to assist the economic and sociocultural development of the region. However, aside from the transnational complications in a
region lacking long-term stability, there are questions regarding whether Turkey can provide the
necessary initial investments in order to procure the long-term benefits. See, e.g., Ali Unal, Turkey
Will Invest $10 Billion in Southeastern Anatolia Project, DAILY SABAH (Mar. 8, 2015),
https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2015/03/08/turkey-will-invest-10-billion-in-southeasternanatolia-project.
111. See Murthy, supra note 17, at 95.
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are met with technological solutions designed to reduce waste and
improve efficiency.112
The total cost of providing access to clean water is staggering, even
when the initial costs are spread out over the course of several decades.
According to most commentators, these total cost figures are dynamic,
for the magnitude of the water industry “is simply too extensive to be
viewed in a composite manner.”113 In the Infrastructure to 2030 report,
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(“OECD”) estimates that the average annual costs for global water
infrastructure and water-related services will approach $1.04 trillion
(USD) by 2025.114 Yet, the enormity of this total only includes the
cumulative estimated costs of clean water for the twenty OECD
member countries, combined with Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the
“BRIC countries”), and between the years 2008–2025.115 On a global
scale, this total is much higher, for the annual $1.04 trillion in projected
expenditures does not include the project costs among non-OECD
countries. Thus, many developing countries that are most severely in
need of clean water and many regions of Latin America, South
America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East are excluded from the
calculation.116 Within the realm of transaction costs, many of these
estimates do not even account for issues such as water scarcity,
regulatory developments, sustainability regimes (i.e., IWRM),
financing costs, and accumulating shortfall deficits.117 Developing
countries must also consider many of these same transaction costs, as
well as additional concerns over obtaining new water supplies and
constructing adequate distribution/storage systems.
1.

Financing Water Infrastructure Projects

In order to finance infrastructure projects, various funding
mechanisms will benefit from investors that recognize the advantages
associated with private-sector participation in the global water
industry. Water-related investments have traditionally focused on

112. BARLOW & CLARK, supra note 100, at 73–85 (describing desalination, nanotechnology,
and other emerging technologies).
113. HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 42. Clean water refers to all related activities within the
full spectrum of water, wastewater, storm water, and recycled water.
114. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., INFRASTRUCTURE TO 2030: TELECOM,
LAND TRANSPORT, WATER AND ELECTRICITY 313–14 (2006) (Table 5.16).
115. Id. at 313–14.
116. HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 42–43.
117. Id. at 44–45.
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equities, which provide the most straightforward vehicle to realize
gains associated with the fundamentals of the industry.118
Growth in the private equity market may be particularly
compatible with large-scale water infrastructure projects. “Private
equity is an important potential source of capital for the water sector
that could drive consolidation, efficiency and new investments in
technology and infrastructure.”119 In general, private equity funds are
a collection of investors who can commit large sums of money for long
periods of time.120 As the general partner, the investment manager will
seek high net worth individuals and institutional investors as limited
partners to invest directly into private companies or pursue buyouts of
public companies. Capital is then used to fund new technologies,
pursue acquisitions, or augment the company’s balance sheet. Most
importantly, because private equity investments have long holding
periods, investors are not seeking immediate returns, meaning that
time-consuming infrastructure projects will retain the requisite capital
throughout their duration. Investors that plan to maintain a certain
infrastructure investment over the course of twenty years, subjecting
themselves to substantial stakeholder scrutiny, are much more likely to
invest in companies that have not “cut corners.”
The private sector may play a serious role because the lifecycle
costs to construct, maintain, and operate infrastructure services are
primarily capital costs. Within the international water sector,
expanding access to water is a potentially robust investment that also
ensures that people receive their right to water. On a global scale,
leading private investment firms have platforms to investment capital
in growth markets, including the diverse water sectors. Aqua
International Partners, L.P., a private equity fund of TPG Capital,
focused on investing in specialized companies providing water and
water-related products to emerging market economies.121 Recently,
Blackstone Energy Partners, another leading investment firm,

118. HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 293.
119. US Water Sector Transformation, supra note 11, at 9.
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/
120. Private
Equity,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
privateequity.asp?ad=dirN&qo=investopediaSiteSearch&qsrc=0&o=40186 (last visited Mar. 16,
2016).
121. Company
Overview
of
Aqua
International
Partners,
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=18839. William K.
Reilly was the Founding Partner of Aqua International. He previously served as Administrator
of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (1989–1993) and president of the World Wildlife
Fund (1985–1989). The investment firm TPG now has over $70 billion under management, having
invested in approximately 300 companies.
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announced the creation of Global Water Development Partners, a
company designed to “support companies with critically-needed
capital to create long-term and sustainable water facilities…and to
identify, develop, finance, construct, and operate large scale
independent water development projects globally.”122 Estimates
suggest a majority of current funding for all types of infrastructure
projects comes from public sources, primarily debt investment from
state-owned development banks.123
Institutional investors have also begun to find attractive deals
investing in water infrastructure projects.124 In recognition of the
extensive time required to complete infrastructure projects, these longterm assets are paired with institutional investors, including the longterm liabilities of insurance companies, reinsurers, pension funds, and
sovereign wealth funds. Although institutional investors in the U.S.,
like the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(“CalPERS”), have expanded their strategies to include water
investments, “they’re still far behind their peers in Australia and
Europe, where water infrastructure has been a mainstay of portfolios
for decades.”125 The World Bank noted that on a global scale
“infrastructure re-emerged as a popular, nearly consensus solution to
the economic and societal woes of developing countries and
industrialized nations alike.”126 Describing the potential opportunities
for investment in the water market, one investment manager
characterized the status of water infrastructure investments as being
“in the first inning of what is going to be an 11-inning Yankees-Red
Sox game.”127
122. Press Release, Blackstone, Blackstone Energy Partners Establishes Global Water
Development
Platform
(Mar.
27,
2014),
https://www.blackstone.com/media/pressreleases/article/blackstone-energy-partners-establishes-global-water-development-platform. As
a global leader in growth equity, real estate investments, hedge funds, and a diverse credit
portfolio, The Blackstone Group claims an estimated $336 billion (USD) assets under
management as of Dec. 31, 2015. The Firm, BLACKSTONE, http://www.blackstone.com/thefirm/overview (last visited Sept. 28, 2017).
123. Jordan Z. Schwartz, Institutional Investment in Infrastructure: A View from the Bridge of
a
Development
Agency,
THE
WORLD
BANK
(Apr.
16,
2015),
http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/institutional-investment-infrastructure-view-bridgedevelopment-agency.
124. Kaitlin Ugolik, Investors Finally Tap Into U.S. Water Market, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
(June
24,
2015),
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/3464966/investorspensions/investors-finally-tap-into-us-water-market.html#.WcMsdtOGMWo.
125. Id.
126. See Schwartz, supra note 123 (estimating that less than fifteen percent of all types of
infrastructure investment actually involve some form of private participation).
127. Ugolik, supra note 124.
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From a specialized standpoint, other firms are integrating
specialized water investment strategies. Summit Global Management,
a registered investment adviser with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, invests directly into water-related equities and physical
water assets, through both managed accounts and private investment
partnerships.128 In the decentralized water system of the U.S., an
estimated 90% of the water-utilities are government-owned.129 The
water sector traditionally raised capital through municipal bonds.130
However, many U.S. water utilities have sought greater access to
private capital to withstand the shortfalls in public financing.131
Through innovative financing options such as financing from
infrastructure equity funds, the water sector seeks to “expand the
number of market participants and types of securities beyond the
municipal bond market and to improve the awareness and
attractiveness of water infrastructure projects for new private
investors.”132
Despite the breadth of the municipal bond market, including both
general obligation and revenue bonds, some commentators suggest
that many water investors continue to overlook this asset class.133 At
some point during or after the infrastructure project, governments
must repay these financing costs. General obligation bonds are issued
with governmental authority that provides the power to levy taxes for
the repayment of the bonds. Revenue bonds are issued to finance
particular projects that will generate rates (i.e., income) to repay the
bonds. Depending on the circumstances of the given locality, there are
various options for pursuing water-related development or expansion
projects.
Consider the following remarks by natural resource economist Dr.
David B. Brooks in a publication analyzing water management
regimes. The sentiment underscores both the market potential for
investors, along with the alarming realities that permeate water
management efforts on a global scale: “[W]ater is often oversupplied
relative to demand, generally underpriced relative to its intrinsic and
economic values, and governed by institutions geared to augment
128. SUMMIT WATER CAPITAL ADVISORS, http://www.summitwatercapital.com (last visited
Feb. 17, 2016).
129. US Water Sector Transformation, supra note 11, at 6.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Other financing options for the water sector include private activity bonds,
infrastructure equity funds, and investments from state revolving funds.
133. HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 292–94.
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rather than to manage demand.”134 The agricultural sector itself
comprises an estimated seventy percent of all freshwater consumption
globally,135 and concepts of “virtual water” reflect the commodification
of water.
These complications are further amplified by the fact that water’s
price, at least in most parts of the world, is not a reflection of water’s
value in use. Rather, the value of water is a reflection of delivery and
infrastructure costs, specifically wells, pipes, treatment, and many
other features. Despite these concerns, economic solutions are at the
forefront of potential avenues to mitigate water scarcity concerns by
reducing transaction costs and improving productivity.136
C. Role of Water Infrastructure in Economic Growth
The lack of adequate infrastructure is a seminal challenge in
achieving an efficient allocation of resources, in terms of both
economics and providing the right to water. Despite this impediment,
investment opportunities in the water infrastructure sector establish a
platform upon which individuals, governments, and private-sector
investors can reconcile their differences to achieve an efficient
equilibrium among the various parties.
Infrastructure has been described in broad terms as “the physical
framework that supports and sustains virtually all economic activity.”137
This definition is more alarming considering the consequences that
affect individuals who cannot even access their right to water because
their governments cannot provide adequate infrastructure and
distribution systems. Because water is the “dominant constituent” for
human life, the State’s inability to ensure the provision of this resource
can have vast negative consequences for both citizen and country. The
failure of governments or public-sector utilities to ensure the
availability of water—both in sufficient quantity and acceptable
quality—may influence poverty, food security, human disease,
economic development, and national security.138 The corresponding
134. David B. Brooks, An Operational Definition of Water Management, 22 INT’L J. WATER
RESOURCES 521, 522 (2006).
135. 2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 12, at 6. Of water that is extracted for
human purposes, in addition to 70% used by agriculture, 20% is used by industry (including power
generation), and just 10% is used for direct human consumption. Id.
136. See generally DAVID ZETLAND, THE END OF ABUNDANCE: ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS TO
WATER SCARCITY 31–51 (2011).
137. See STEVE HOFFMAN, PLANET WATER: INVESTING IN THE WORLD’S MOST VALUABLE
RESOURCE 7–8 (2009).
138. Id.
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contrast is therefore reasonable to presume: if governments do provide
access to water and sanitation, countries may then experience reduced
poverty and disease outbreaks as well as increased economic growth.
Water is the world’s third largest industry after oil & gas
production and energy generation.139 In many developing countries,
existing infrastructure is not sufficient to deliver water to its citizens.
The water distribution system is a complex interconnected network of
pipes, pumps, and treatment facilities, requiring significant financial
resources for construction and maintenance. In Madras, India, for
example, at least fifty percent of the population does not receive access
to water from the main water infrastructure network.140 The same
figures are true in Maputo, Mozambique.141 In fact, the figures in
Bandung, Indonesia, are even higher, as over sixty percent of the
individuals are not served by the region’s main water network.142 As a
result, in an empirical study about water distribution systems in
developing regions of Asia and the Pacific, researchers affiliated with
the World Bank suggested that private-sector involvement in the
provision of water was more efficient than otherwise.143
The lack of adequate water infrastructure is a global issue that
extends to both developed and developing countries. The problem is
clear—either the infrastructure does not exist, or if infrastructure does
exist, significant capital is required to fully modernize the system. On
the other hand, emerging global markets will present opportunities for
water-related investments, such as the infrastructure and water
distribution sectors. Within the global hydrocommerce markets,
growth drivers like industrialization and urbanization become more
acute in rapidly expanding economies like China and India.144 These
countries recognize the vital role of water as it relates to their
expanding economies. For instance, China makes up 21% of the
world’s population but only has 7% of the renewable water

139. Fabrizio Marrella, On the Changing Structure of International Investment Law: The
Human Right to Water and ICSID Arbitration, 12 INT’L COMM. L. REV. 335, 335 (2010).
140. SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Antonio Estache & Martin A. Rossi, Comparing the Performance of Public and Private
Water Companies in Asia and Pacific Region: What a Stochastic Cost Frontier Shows, THE WORLD
BANK
(1999),
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1999/09/10/0000
94946_9908190532063/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf.
144. See HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 65–75.
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resources.145 Water has been mentioned as the single biggest
impediment to China’s long-term success.146 In its most recent “FiveYear Plan,” China plans to spend $128 billion over the next five years
on water infrastructure projects alone.147
In the U.S., government and industry sources estimate that it will
cost between $17-$50 billion per year to maintain and repair an
inefficient water infrastructure system that was constructed more than
fifty years ago.148 Within the infrastructure sector, capital investments
can expand the productive capacity of a region, both by increasing
resources and by enhancing the productivity of existing resources.149 In
fact, investments in public infrastructure can positively affect the
economic growth and economic output of the region.150
D. The “Water Justice” Movement’s Criticism of Private-Sector
Involvement
The “water justice” movement arose out of a controversial protest
in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000.151 After the absolute privatization of
water utilities lead to a significant increase in prices, widespread civil
unrest resulted in the Bolivian government cancelling its contract with
the private sector operator.152 These protests were the symbolic
beginnings of the anti-privatization sentiment that sparked the human
right to water movement.153

145. See Rob Schmitz, A Warning for Parched China: A City Runs Out of Water,
MARKETPLACE (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/04/21/world/warningparched-china-city-runs-out-water.
146. See id. (reporting that prominent journalist and author Dai Quing believes China’s water
crisis is “the greatest danger facing China today.”).
147. See
generally
CHINA
WATER
RISKChina’s
12th
Five-Year
Plan,
http://chinawaterrisk.org/regulations/water-policy/12th-five-year-plan/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2017).
148. ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 83.
149. See Alicia H. Munnell, Policy Watch: Infrastructure Investment & Economic Growth, 6
J. ECON. PERSPS. 189, 190–91 (1992) (stating that public capital investment, including investment
within the infrastructure section, “can expand the productive capacity of an area, both by
increasing resources and by enhancing the productivity of existing resources”).
150. Id. at 196–97.
151. Rocio Bustamante et al., Seeing Through the Concept of Water as a Human Right in
Bolivia, in THE RIGHT TO WATER: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL STRUGGLES 223, 231
(Farhana Sultana & Alex Loftus eds., 2012)
152. Id.
153. See Id. at 231–32. (noting the “well-documented Water Wars of Cochabama became the
poster child and impetus for the international Anti-Privatiation and Right to Water Movement
throughout the 2000s”); see also SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 72–73
(noting that privatization increased the price of water, leading to civil unrest).
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In her book Blue Covenant, Maude Barlow strongly criticized
private-sector involvement in the global water industry.154 Barlow’s
argument, in terms of the law and economics analysis, is addressed in
more detail in Section VI. The principle of water as an economic good
has sparked much controversy within the water justice movement: “the
treatment of water as an economic good would pave the way for greater
commodification and privatization, placing control over a vital natural
resource in the hands of few who would sell it for a price.”155
Privatization has seemingly gathered a negative connotation, and
thus the World Bank only uses the term “privatization” when referring
to complete divestiture of public assets.156 When less than complete
divestiture is in effect, the World Bank prefers terms like “private
sector participation” or “public-private partnerships,” particularly
when referring to leases or management contracts for water
distribution and infrastructure.157 The contention of this Article is that
to even begin the public vs. private debate regarding water utilities,
there must first be an adequate water distribution system in place to
deliver the water to the consumer. Many governments lack the
financial resources to complete these infrastructure projects. From a
practical standpoint, the private sector may be best suited to provide
the level of capital investment necessary to develop and maintain these
expensive distribution systems.
IV. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
“Eventually, all things merge into one, and a river runs through
it.”158
A multitude of complex challenges are evident when describing
the human right to water as a legal obligation. These challenges exist
because water is fundamental to human existence. Throughout the
world, legal scholars suggest that a “growing number of national
constitutions guarantee a right to water.”159 From a biological
perspective, there is an absolute physical requirement for this natural

154. MAUDE BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT: THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS AND
THE COMING BATTLE FOR THE RIGHT TO WATER 58 (2009).
155. Murthy, supra note 8, at 93.
156. Id. at 124.
157. BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 39.
158. NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT AND OTHER STORIES 1 (1976).
(Need book, requested from library)
159. Rhett B. Larson, The New Right to Water, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2181 (2013).
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resource. But it is more than just a resource, as humans have developed
a cultural, religious, and spiritual appreciation of water that permeates
almost all notions of humanity.160
Under international law, the human right to water continues to
trend towards developing into a legal, justiciable obligation for states.
Although the legal basis of this right remains a subject of debate in
legal scholarship,161 for purposes of the law and economics analysis, this
Article presupposes that the legal status of the right to water will
continue to progress towards, and ultimately achieve, international
recognition as an enforceable human right. The following
developments are presented in support of the prevailing theory that
the human right to water is evolving into a recognizable obligation for
states within international and customary law.
Throughout the historical development of human rights,
particularly at seminal conferences and conventions during an era
beginning in the 1950s through the early 1970s,the drafters of
international legal and institutional agreements “implicitly considered
water to be a fundamental resource.”162 Thus, these early agreements
did not explicitly recognize the human right to water.163 The 1977 Mar
del Plata Conference in Argentina was among the first to recognize the
human right to water, and much of the subsequent debate can be traced
to this Conference.164
The following sub-sections examine various international
developments that are of particular interest to principles of economic

160. The Bible contains many references to water, including Revelations 21:6 (New
International Version translation) (“To the thirsty I will give water without cost from the spring
of the water of life.”). Throughout history, civilizations and communities have prospered from
the resources that living near a river provides, including numerous Native American tribes along
the banks of the Mississippi River. Many global communities also suffered when that same river
floods. Perhaps this is the source to help explain the importance of water and waterways from
religious, cultural, and spiritual perspectives.
161. See, e.g., Hardberger, supra note 5, at 347. Larson, supra note 159, at 2184. SALMAN &
MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14 at 8; Peter Gleick, The Human Right to Water, 1 WATER
POL’Y 487, 490 (1998).
162. See Gleick, supra note 161, at 490 (noting that among the early human rights conventions
were the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”)).
163. See Murthy, supra note 8, at 92.
164. SALMAN M. A. SALMAN & SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14 at 9; U.N.
Water Conference, Report of the United Nations Water Conference, 37, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.70/29
(Mar. 14–25,1977). Resolution II issued an Action Plan on “Community Water Supply,” being
the first of its kind to declare that, “[A]ll peoples, whatever stage of development and their social
and economic conditions, have the right to access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality
equal to their basic needs.” See id., at 66; see generally U.N. Conference on Env’t and Dev.,
Agenda 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (June 3–14, 1992) (reaffirming similar principles).
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efficiency, as well as examples that suggest that the human right to
water is evolving into a legal obligation that instills a justiciable duty
on governments to provide access to this natural resource.
A. Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development (1992)
Although the 1992 International Conference on Water and
Environment recognized water as a human right, the Dublin Statement
on Water and Sustainable Development ( “Dublin Statement”)
emphasized the economic value of water among its four Dublin
Principles.165 Principle 4 of the Dublin Statement provided that
“[w]ater has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be
recognized as an economic good.”166 The Dublin Statement recognized
that water had been historically undervalued from an economic
perspective, and provided guidance regarding Principle 4:
Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of
all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an
affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic value of water
has led to wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource.
Managing water as an economic good is an important way of achieving
efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and
protection of water resources.167
Despite the controversial sentiment that accompanied the
treatment of water as an economic good, Principle 4 of the Dublin
Statement influenced and promoted “water services strategies that
seek to achieve economic efficiency, environmental sustainability, and
social equity.”168
Principles of economic efficiency in water use are also relevant to
Integrated Water Resource Management (“IWRM”), the dominant
paradigm for water resource management that evolved out of the
Dublin Principles.169 IWRM is a holistic management approach that
165. Int’l Conference on Water and the Env’t, The Dublin Statement on Water and
Sustainable Development 4 (Jan. 26–31, 1992) [hereinafter Dublin Statement]. See also SALMAN
& MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 9 (noting that Principle 4 of the Dublin Statement
characterizes water as an economic good).
166. Dublin Statement, supra note 165, at 4.
167. Id. (emphasis added). The economic perspectives within the Dublin Statement initiated
a controversy, which evolved into the water justice movement that opposed private-sector
involvement in water. The harsh criticism aimed at privatization regimes is discussed in more
detail infra, at Section VI.
168. Murthy, supra note 8, at 94 (emphasis added).
169. Hugo Tremblay, A Clash of Paradigms in the Water Sector? Tensions and Synergies
Between Integrated Water Resources Management and the Human Rights-Based Approach to
Development, 51 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 307, 308 (2011).
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provides a framework to promote sustainable development while also
achieving optimal economic efficiency.170 Most importantly, an IWRM
approach provides a management platform that emphasizes the nexus
between the contrasting ideologies of economic efficiency in water use
and social equity.171
These prevailing economic factors—both opportunity costs and
social costs—suggest that the Coase Theorem, as well as other
economic efficiency analyses, may be particularly relevant to solving
global water challenges. To further emphasize the relevance of the
subsequent economic analyses in this Article, the Global Water
Partnership provides the authoritative definition of IWRM, describing
the management approach as one that “maximize[s] the resultant
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.”172
B. U.N. General Comment No. 15 (2002)
The legal basis for the right to water, at least in terms of a soft law
instrument, was set forth in 2002 by the U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, which adopted the human right to water in
its General Comment No. 15 (“General Comment”).173 Legal scholars
suggest that the General Comment was one of the “greatest victories
to date for those seeking to establish water as a human right.”174 In
terms of encouraging countries to seek private-sector investments to
realize the right to water from a practical standpoint, most notable are
the provisions pertaining to “accessibility” and the “obligation to fulfil”
the right.175 Paragraph 2 of the General Comment provides the legal
basis for the right:

170. See id. at 311 (“IWRM is a holistic approach applicable to all water resources and water
uses . . . .”).
171. Id. at 310–11.
172. GLOBAL WATER P’SHIP TECH. ADVISORY COMM., INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT 22 (2000). More recently, additional IWRM definitions were released after the
2009 World Water Forum and World Water Week. See, e.g., GLOBAL WATER P’SHIP,
INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: BETTER WATER MANAGEMENT FOR
DEVELOPMENT 5 (Roberto Lenton & Mike Muller eds., 2009).
173. See General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 1 (“The Committee has been
confronted continually with the widespread denial of the right to water in developing as well as
developed countries.”). The right to water is derived from the right to an adequate standard of
living (Art. 11) and the right to the highest attainable standard of health. Id. para. 3. See also
Fabrizio Marrella, On the Changing Structure of International Investment Law: The Human Right
to Water and ICSID Arbitration, 12 INT’L COMMUN. L. REV. 335, 338 (2010).
174. Hardberger, supra note 5, at 347.
175. General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 25 (emphasis added).
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The human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe,
acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and
domestic uses. An adequate amount of safe water is necessary to
prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related
diseases and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and
domestic hygienic requirements.176
This right to water is dependent on three normative factors—
availability, quality, and accessibility.177 The accessibility requirement
implicates notions of economic efficiency, from both a textual
interpretation perspective and a practical implementation perspective.
The General Comment offers further elaboration regarding the
substantive obligations associated with the right to water, noting that
the obligations are of immediate effect.178 The General Comment also
recognized the limited financial resources of some countries, but
nevertheless still provided that countries must take “deliberate,
concrete, and targeted” steps towards guaranteeing this right to all
individuals.179 These substantive obligations, particularly the
accessibility factor, create a foundation for establishing the right to
water as an enforceable obligation recognized by international law.
Considering the inadequate infrastructure encompassing the
global water crisis, the General Comment elaborates on accessibility:
“[w]ater and water facilities and services have to be accessible to
everyone without discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State
party.”180 The Drafters of this provision undoubtedly knew of the
deficient water distribution systems prevalent in both developing and
developed countries. In practical terms, this definition is central to
creating an obligation for countries to construct and maintain the
necessary infrastructure to fulfill the right for all individuals—a starting
point for answering questions on how and how far the right extends.
The General Comment further referenced several dimensions of
accessibility. The “physical accessibility” dimension provides that the

176. Id. para. 2 (emphasis added).
177. Id. para. 12 (proclaiming that the three factors apply in all circumstances, though the
adequacy of water necessary to fulfill the right may vary according to different conditions).
178. Id. para. 17.
179. Id.; see also SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 65.
180. General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 12(c) (emphasis added). Paragraph 37
proceeds to confirm the core obligations of General Comment No. 3 (1990), including the
obligation “[t]o ensure the right of access to water and water facilities and services on a nondiscriminatory basis.” Id. para. 37(c).
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right extends “for all sections of the population,” and is accessible for
“each household, educational institution and workplace.”181
Private-sector participation is further implicated in the General
Comment’s provision on “General Legal Obligations.” Paragraph 18
recognizes the practical funding challenges for these large-scale
projects: “[r]ealization of the right should be feasible and practicable,
since all States parties exercise control over a broad range of resources,
including water, technology, financial resources and international
assistance.”182 Accordingly, the right to water, within the prism of
human rights, maintains three specific legal obligations, which
indirectly encourage the right kind of private-sector involvement: the
obligations to respect, to protect, and to fulfil.183
The obligation to fulfil the right can be viewed as action-based,
such that it obligates the government to take the steps necessary to
fulfill the right by facilitating, promoting, and providing the
accessibility of water to its citizens.184 This includes adopting a national
water strategy and ensuring that water is affordable for everyone.
Paragraph 27 is the most encouraging to potential investment
opportunities because it explicitly references the role of third party
actors: “[a]ny payment for water services has to be based on the
principle of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately or
publicly provided, are affordable for all, including socially
disadvantaged groups.”185 The General Comment goes on to mandate
that states adopt integrated and comprehensive management
strategies.186 Among the various provisions, the suggestions to increase
the efficient use of water and reduce water wastage in its distribution
are relevant to addressing the needs to repair or develop
infrastructure.187 In fact, the General Comment seemingly
contemplates private-sector investment in other countries, explicitly
mentioning “financial and technical assistance” as a means to facilitate
that country’s ability to fulfil its obligation to provide the right to
water.188
181. Id. para. 12(c)(i). Four dimensions are enumerated to characterize the accessibility
factor, including physical accessibility, economic accessibility (i.e., affordable for all), nondiscrimination, and information accessibility. Id.
182. Id. para. 18.
183. Id. para. 20.
184. Id. para. 25.
185. Id. para. 27.
186. Id. para. 28.
187. Id.
188. Id. para. 34. (“Depending on the availability of resources, States should facilitate
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To ensure the accessibility of water, in terms of achieving
economic efficiency, governments that cannot provide this right to
their citizens may further be obligated to seek private-sector
participation through water infrastructure development projects.
Paragraph 41 of the General Comment provides this function, “If
resource constraints render it impossible for a State Party to comply
fully with Covenant obligations, [the State Party] has the burden of
justifying that every effort has nevertheless been made to use all
resources.”189 Otherwise, if a state lacks the necessary capital to fund
projects that will ensure adequate distribution networks, then
presumably taking “every effort” will implicate the potential for
increased private-sector participation. The General Comment’s
provision on “Implementation” does in fact encourage private-sector
activity. Pursuant to Paragraph 50, countries should adopt legislation
that helps “operationalize their right to water strategy,” including “the
intended collaboration with civil society, private sector and
international organizations.”190
Although a sense of optimism may be read from its provisions that
seemingly encourage private-sector participation, the General
Comment addresses the bad actors that will undoubtedly be present
among international third-party participants.191 Paragraph 24 provides
an obligation for states to prevent third-parties (such as private-sector
operation or control of water services) “from compromising equal,
affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe, and acceptable
water.”192
In 2003, the Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
highlighted the underlying concerns and negative externalities that
may be associated with private sector participation:
While promoting investment through privatesector participation in the water and sanitation sector
might be a possible strategy to upgrade the sector, there
is concern that private-sector participation might
threaten the goal of the basic service provision for all,
particularly the poor, and transform water from being
realization of the right to water in other countries, for example through provision of water
resources, financial and technical assistance, and provide the necessary aid when required.”).
189. Id. para.41 (emphasis added).
190. Id. para. 50.
191. See generally id. The General Comment refers to the private sector as “third parties”
throughout.
192. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 73; General Comment No.15,
supra note 8, para.24.
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source basic human need to primarily an economic
good.193
These concerns are reasonable because these negative
externalities have been consequential (e.g., Cochabamba, Bolivia).194
However, as discussed infra,195 the economic analysis from a country
perspective offers alternative examples of ways to circumvent these
negative externalities. Instances of government resourcefulness have
provided strategies that make it possible to maximize the benefits for
the private sector and ensure that every citizen receives its right to
water.
The provisions of the General Comment (and similar U.N.
Comments) are intended to clarify the rights within the underlying
source document, which is further intended to help countries
implement the U.N. Covenants. The legal basis for the right to water
remains the source of much advocacy, because “[c]omments are not
binding per se, can only elucidate existing rights, and cannot create new
rights or expand existing ones.”196 The General Comment remains
important, eliciting controversy because some opponents feel that the
Committee went too far in the creation of a new “right,” whereas
supporters believe it acknowledged an already existing or implied
right.197 Perhaps the law and economics analysis can be utilized in
further support of establishing the legal basis for the right to water.
C. U.N. Human Rights Council Resolution 15/9 (2010)
In July 2010, a resolution on the human right to drinking water
and sanitation was introduced to the General Assembly.198
Commentators suggest that the resolution was a surprise for many
countries, as evidenced by the abstention of forty-one countries from
the ultimate vote. According to the General Assembly minutes, it
appears that many of these countries may have chosen to abstain for
procedural reasons rather than substantive concerns.199 Meanwhile,
193. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 73–74, n. 272. It is important to
note that the Authors of the quote just finished mentioning the unfortunate situation in
Cochabamba, and thus may have been considering private-sector involvement in terms of
absolute privatization of the water utility, rather than some of the more practical investment
strategies mentioned in this Article. Id. at 72–74.
194. See id. at 72–74 (discussing the effects of privatization on Cochabama, Bolivia).
195. See infra, Section V.B.2 regarding the discussion on economic efficiency for countries.
196. Hardberger, supra note 5, at 348.
197. See Murthy, supra note 8, at 101.
198. G.A. Res. 64/PV.108, supra note 8.
199. Murthy, supra note 8, at 102–03.
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122 countries voted to adopt a resolution that “[r]ecognizes the right to
safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as a human right.”200
In the subsequent months, the U.N. Human Rights Council
adopted, by consensus on September 30, 2010, Resolution 15/9 on
human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation.201
Resolution 15/9 was more specific than any prior resolution, affirming
that the right to water is “inextricably related to the right to the highest
attainable standard of physical and mental health, as well as the right
to life and human dignity.”202 Most interesting to the future of global
hydro-commerce, Resolution 15/9 also addressed the role of privatesector participation in providing access to water.203 According to legal
scholars, Resolution 15/9 “affirm[ed] that states may opt to involve
non-state actors provided that they maintain primary responsibility for
ensuring the realization of human rights.”204 This analysis suggests that
going forward, countries are obligated to provide access to water, and
if the government alone cannot provide the right to water then perhaps
they should seek private-sector participation.
A closer examination of Resolution 15/9 seemingly provides more
opportunities for private-sector participation in the delivery of the
right to water. Clause 7 of Resolution 15/9 “[r]ecognizes that States, in
accordance with their laws, regulations and public policies, may opt to
involve non-State actors in the provision of safe drinking water and
sanitation services and, regardless of the form of provision, should
ensure transparency, non-discrimination and accountability.”205 In
effect, the Human Rights Council affirmed that the human right to
water is not incompatible with private-sector participation.
D. State Obligations to Integrate Private-Sector Involvement within
Water Delivery Regimes
One assumption underlying the argument in this Article is that the
General Comments are currently not binding per se, because the
Committee has no authority to establish new obligations under the
ICESCR. Nevertheless, scholars argue that the General Comments
“provide a critical mechanism for developing a normative and

200. See G.A. Res. 64/PV.108, supra note 8.
201. Murthy, supra note 8, at 104.
202. Id.
203. Id. “The resolution also has several clauses that address head-on the debate around
privatization . . . .”. Id.
204. Id. (examining H.R.C. Res. 15/9 at 2).
205. Human Rights Council Res. 15/9, 3 (Oct. 6, 2010).
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contextualized understanding of the provisions of the ICESCR.”206 Is
the right to water a justiciable obligation? International law does not
require agreement for a country to be bound to that idea.207 In the
context of a human right to water, even countries that abstain from
signing the international treaty could still be bound by a provision if its
level of general acceptance as a rule rises to the level of customary
law.208
“The human right to water implies considerable state
responsibility and action.”209 In terms of the availability, quality, and
accessibility of water, these substantive obligations may invite privatesector involvement. The right to water is not a reality unless a
government possesses both plans for implementation and financing.210
According to the World Water Council (“WWC”), some State
governments may be reluctant to take progressive steps to implement
the right to water because they lack financial resources.211 This is
especially true in developing countries where a significant portion of
the population lacks sufficient access to water.
Even the WWC acknowledges, at least indirectly, that the
implementation of the right to water will involve the private sector:
“[p]ublic authorities must exercise effective control over water services
after having chosen the most appropriate management method—
public, private or mixed—for these services. The State should enable
the sub-sovereign entities to implement [the] right to water.”212 The
particular modalities of implementation will necessarily differ between
countries, with regard to whether the infrastructure is available as well
as whether a large portion of people are lacking access to water.
Sovereign debt is a particularly complex institution, although the
following provides a general overview of capital market funding in
relation to water management projects. As these sub-sovereign
(regional and local) levels of government begin implementing the right

206. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 5.
207. Amy Hardberger, Whose Job Is It Anyway?: Governmental Obligations Created by the
Human Right to Water, 41 TEX. INT. L.J. 533, 536–37 (2006), See generally General Comment No.
15, supra note 8, para. 17 (stating that the Covenant “also imposes on States parties various
obligations which are of immediate effect.”).
208. See Hardberger, supra note 5 at 536–37.
209. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 65.
210. CELINE DUBREUIL, THE RIGHT TO WATER: FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION 40
(2006),
http://www.worldwatercouncil.org/fileadmin/wwc/Library/RightToWater_FinalText_Cover.pdf.
211. Id. at 13.
212. Id. at 14.
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to water by providing the infrastructure for the requisite access to the
resource, capital markets and securities may yield an increasingly
prominent role.213 Debt instruments, financed by bonds or other
securities, afford various levels of government the ability to construct
the infrastructure necessary to implement the right to water. From a
financial perspective, this allows the governmental authorities to enter
the capital markets to raise funds for various water management
projects, while also maintaining focus on long-term financial planning.
Although there are many funding alternatives, international investors
may be attracted to the benefits provided by the project diversification
that is present through participation with distinct local and regional
governments.
General Comment 15 further recognizes the relationship between
the private sector and the implementation of the right to water:
The international financial institutions, notably the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank,
should take into account the right to water in their
lending policies, credit agreements, structural
adjustment programmes and other development
projects, so that the enjoyment of the right to water is
promoted. When examining the reports of State parties
and their ability to meet the obligations to realize the
right to water, the Committee will consider the effects
of the assistance provided by all other actors.214
Most legal scholars agree that the human right to safe drinking
water is acknowledged within the arena of international law.215
However, the actual obligations can be understood as either provision
rights or participation rights.216 Provision rights are a broad reference
to the right that has been discussed herein, where the government
acknowledges substantive obligations to provide minimum quantities
and qualities of the good or service.217 In comparison, a participation
right mandates that the government is legally proscribed from
213. Stefan Vetter et al., Small is beautiful?, DEUTSCHE BANK RESEARCH (July 25, 2014),
https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_ENPROD/PROD0000000000338741/Small_is_beautiful%3F_Capital_market_funding_for_sub.pdf.
214. General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 60.
215. See Murthy, supra note 8, at 90 (“While the human right to safe drinking is arguably
recognized in international law, the legal status of an independent right to sanitation is less
clear . . . .”). Id.
216. See Larson, supra note 159, at 2181 (“This Article divides all rights into two broad
categories – provision rights and participation rights.”).
217. See id. at 2209–25.
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interfering with a citizen’s access to resources controlled by the state.218
In many countries, the right to water is considered a provision right,
which could have implications in terms of “enforceability, equity, and
sustainability.”219

V. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO WATER AS A LEGAL
REGIME
The lack of effective management and inadequate provision of
water presents challenges that threaten human health, economies, and
ecosystems. The right to water and private-sector participation may
appear to be facially incompatible. This sentiment is a matter of
perspective, one which overlooks the correlative nature of these two
paradigms. Every citizen in every country needs water. While the
consequences of private-sector participation have been welldocumented; the practical benefits and positive externalities are all too
often overlooked. Given the breadth of these implications, one can also
presume the prevalence of transaction costs and externalities that
permeate the water distribution industry.
To further evaluate the allocation of water resources within a law
and economics context, let us consider a water distribution regime in
the hypothetical country of Rioland, a developing country that is
seeking to provide all of its citizens with the right to water while
continuing to develop as an emerging economic market. In Rioland,
the government has commissioned an extensive infrastructure project
that will address their goals. The analysis of this hypothetical can
disassemble the broader themes, while also explicitly examining the
three principal parties to a bargain. Here, the underlying bargain is of
the type that enables the private sector to work with governments in
the delivery of the right to water, thus benefiting the citizens that
otherwise would have received this vital resource. Despite the
transaction costs and externalities that may be apparent in certain
scenarios, the following analyses provide a framework to achieve an
efficient equilibrium through cognitive recognition and practical
consideration of predominant features within the water services
industry.
From a macro-level perspective, three principal parties have an
218. See id. at 2181 (“With a participation right, the government is legally proscribed from
interfering with individual citizen’s access to institutions and resources controlled or held in trust by
the state . . . .”).
219. See id.
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interest in the water distribution industry within the hypothetical
country of Rioland. First, governments have overarching interests with
regard to the bargain concerning water delivery services and
infrastructure. These government interests may have financial, social,
health, and cultural implications that must be considered, regardless of
whether the country benefits from the private sector participation.
Next, and most importantly, we consider the citizens of Rioland.
Two types of individuals exist throughout this bargaining process:
individuals that currently have access to water and individuals that
cannot access their right to water, either because of physical limitations
(i.e., inadequate infrastructure) or financial limitations (i.e., cannot
afford the resource). These distinctions are particularly relevant in the
evaluation of transaction costs and externalities.
The final interested party in this bargain is the water distribution
and infrastructure sector. For the purposes of this analysis, assume that
a public-private partnership has been formed to operate water
distribution and services while also developing water infrastructure
that promotes new projects and maintains existing infrastructure. The
water distribution regime in Rioland is not indicative of absolute
privatization, nor does the partnership exhibit monopolistic
tendencies.220 The partnership is structured in a way that projects are
financed by capital from a private equity firm, as the public sector
benefits from transparency and maintains management oversight
concerning water utility decisions. Assume that this private equity firm
is the principal investor from the private sector, with significant capital
from its institutional investors. These investors would like to enter a
market with potential for immediate growth, while maximizing their
long-term gains and diversifying their respective portfolios.
Rioland represents a developing country with the potential to
experience growth and economic development throughout the
industrial and agricultural sectors. Rioland would like to begin
development on a large-scale water infrastructure project that
improves access to the right to water for its citizens. Moderate in size,
the country would like to continue trending towards achieving first
world status, at least in terms of GDP, education, and health. Despite
the cause for optimism, only 80% of the Rioland citizens have access
to clean water. Many of the country’s citizens can afford moderate
prices for the delivery of water, while almost 20% of the citizens do not

220. See ZETLAND, supra note 19, 88–90 (discussing in detail, “that success and failure can
happen at private or public firms, in developed and developing countries”).
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have access to water. Private-sector participation provides the
necessary mechanism to fund Rioland’s water infrastructure project.
Despite the capital investments of $200 million (USD) to improve the
water delivery system and provide new infrastructure for these
objectives, the financial realities are evidence that these projects would
not be possible without the public-private partnership.
The following discussion will first address the numerous
transaction costs that permeate the water sector. These costs,
particularly in the case of certain parties, limit the realization of the
Coasean ideal. To address transaction costs and efficient outcomes, the
discussion will utilize the challenges in hypothetical Rioland. In
addition, further analysis of the parties indicates there is potential to
achieve an efficient outcome because each party is ultimately made
better off. This may provide a practical framework that policy-makers
could rely on within the global water industry. Thus even if the Coase
Theorem does not apply to this scenario because of high transaction
costs, the fact that each party benefits suggests that the legal regime
promoting the right to water exhibits an outcome that obtains an
efficient equilibrium and high Pareto optimality.
A. Coasean Analysis of the Right to Water & Private-Sector
Participation
An efficient allocation of resources requires that the transaction
costs be less than the benefits each party will receive. When two parties
enter a bargain that lacks transaction costs, the outcome is
economically efficient according to the underlying principles of the
Coase Theorem. The complex nature of the water industry, however,
likely prevents transaction costs from ever being zero. Other
alternatives may not yield precisely zero transaction costs, yet there are
opportunities to promote reasonable transaction costs that would
otherwise be higher. The Coasean analysis provides the channels to
identify transaction costs and explore the complexities of the water
distribution industry at the intersection of the right to water and
private-sector participation.
Although the allocation of resources in the hypothetical country
of Rioland may not portray an efficient equilibrium, a law and
economics analysis via the Coase Theorem offers a practical
framework to prompt lower transaction costs. With more than two
parties, each with concealed and unconcealed motivations, the water
sector inherently contributes to instill a sense of unpredictability. Thus,
any efforts to achieve an efficient outcome within the arena of global
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hydro-commerce are influenced by the presence of transaction costs.
As real world governments pursue developments that fulfill their
respective obligations to provide access to water, a preliminary
Coasean analysis offers distinct channels to identify the ultimate
transaction costs that will be encountered throughout the bargaining
processes.
1.

Transaction Costs

Transaction costs are those that occur in the course of making a
deal. It is difficult to dispute that the complexity of the water industry
likely impedes the ability to ever achieve zero transaction costs.
However, there are circumstances that “incentivize activity” by
promoting the prevalence of lower transaction costs.221 The following
analysis identifies the transaction costs for each respective party with
an interest in Rioland’s water industry (i.e., infrastructure & delivery
of the resource).
Governmental institutions face myriad transaction costs in the
transfer or delivery of water to its citizens, analogous to the welldocumented transaction costs in water transfers.222 Transaction costs
may include administrative costs, expenditures for public agency
review, costs to search for private-sector investments, scientific
monitoring costs for hydrology and other disciplines, and brokerage
service fees, among others.223 Other transaction costs range from
financing expenditures, including costs associated with debt or interest
rates, as well as employee fees and political costs. According to water
scholar Joseph Dellapenna, Coasean economics are misapplied to the
concept of water markets when there is an assumption that no
transaction costs are in the exchange.224
Moreover, the Coase Theorem may be limited in terms of its
applicability. Rather than being applicable to all allocations of water
resources, such as the prior appropriation system in the western U.S.,
the Coase Theorem is most applicable when governments facilitate low
221. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, supra note 3, at 15–16.
222. See, e.g., Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs & Peter Butler, Transaction Costs as
Determinants of Water Transfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 397 (1990); see generally Culp, supra
note 66, at 117–20.
223. Howe et al., supra note 222, at 397.
224. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water Law
Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 397–402. The market system, particularly water markets, often
overlooks potentially significant barriers by assuming that the fundamentals of the market will
work themselves out. According to Dellapenna, Coase warned against this “blind faith” when he
criticized those who ignore basic concerns about the success or failures of markets. Id. at 397–98.
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transaction costs and secure the property rights.225 As a result, the
Coase Theorem may be even less applicable within the right to water
legal regime, where governments often lack the institutional capacity
to deliver low transaction costs. This is also true in the developing
world, where many countries have not secured property rights for
water.
For individuals, the existence of transaction costs is often rooted
in the expectation for water, whether financially or physically. Assume
that 80% of the citizens in Rioland have access to affordable water.
Interestingly, it is these individuals who will be most implicated by the
existence of transaction costs. For instance, if water costs are increased
to offset the 20% of the Rioland population that cannot pay, then these
transaction costs could prevent an efficient outcome because the costs
are directly subsumed by those individuals who already have access to
water (i.e., the 80% pays). As a sole individual, the transaction costs
may be minimal in comparison if this citizen is required to pay more to
compensate for the 20% who lack access to water. However, these
transaction costs strain the bargain when costs are accumulated.226
Moreover, if the majority of citizens are used to purchasing resources
at a certain cost, then any tariffs or taxes initiated by the government
to finance the infrastructure projects can be viewed as a potential
transaction cost.
In times of water scarcity, another transaction cost exists when
additional 20% of citizens are allowed to access a finite resource. The
Coase Theorem helps identify the contentions that arise out of the
existence of transaction costs. If 80% of the Rioland population is
expected to pay more for the same service, to offset the inability to pay
by 20% of the population, then the resulting outcome suggests that
transaction costs exist. Nevertheless, as the economic system of
Rioland continues to develop, perhaps the Coase Theorem will be
applicable to future water system challenges in Rioland. If these 20%
of citizens eventually reach the point where they can pay for water,
then future decisions can rely on Coasean perspectives in its decisionmaking.

225. See infra Section VI for further discussion on Coase Theorem and water rights. See C.
Carter Ruml, The Coase Theorem and Western U.S. Appropriative Water Rights, 45 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 169, 199 (2005). The lack of property rights for water is particularly relevant to
citizens in developing countries–the same citizens that lack the accessibility prong of the human
right to water.
226. See generally HOLLY DOREMUS & DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH
BASIN 195–96 (2008).
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Private investors encounter transaction costs because water is
often considered a public good, for which the government holds in trust
for the people and ensures equal use for all. In the right to water legal
regime, private-sector corporations may not have the most incentives
to produce public goods because consumers will consume goods
without paying for them. This could be the case in our hypothetical
Rioland, as the private investors retain fewer profits to compensate for
the 20% of citizens that cannot afford or lack access to water. As a
result, transaction costs exist because these private-sector participants
may not enjoy their maximum level of profitability from their
investments. Furthermore, additional transaction costs for private
investors include currency exposure, in addition to the prevailing
environmental and social pressures.
2.

Alternative Comparisons

As a counter-argument, “water justice” activists may argue that
the existence of transaction costs suggests that private-sector
participation should not be allowed. However, these same transaction
costs still exist throughout the water industry with or without privatesector participation. Thus, the applicability of the Coase Theorem
remains limited even without corporate involvement.
Perhaps a non-traditional approach to the Coasian analysis could
help bridge the gap and expand the applicability of this law and
economics tool. Using the law and economics approach could evaluate
the varying degrees of transaction costs within this particular aspect of
the water industry. In other words, does private-sector participation in
the delivery of water either increase or decrease the transaction costs?
If one particular scenario or investment scheme in a region has lower
transaction costs, then the justifications for participation in certain
regions could be evident.
If these transaction costs decrease with corporate involvement,
then we should allow private-sector participation. However, if these
transaction costs remain present or even increase, then perhaps Maude
Barlow and the “water justice” movement have a stronger argument.
In that case, some regulatory palliatives may be necessary. Thus,
Pigouvian taxation could have a role if the nature of the regulation
actually offsets the transaction costs associated with a Coasean
solution.
The “water justice” movement’s argument against the private
sector seemingly relies on the pessimistic view that corporations are all
strictly motivated by profit and the public sector is strictly motivated
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by the common good. This argument does not address the practicality
of allowing the private sector to perform the water delivery tasks that
the government could not perform. Most importantly, the argument in
favor of public-sector control of the water sector relies on a misguided
view that all actors in the public sector are motivated by the common
good. In reality, many public-sector actors are motivated by political
power and there is not a utopian common good. The narrative that
compares the “bad” private-sector with the “good” public-sector is not
useful or correct. As referenced throughout the Article, both sectors
have experienced successes and failures, and thus we can conclude that
neither approach is overwhelmingly “ideal.” Therefore, we should
instead look for a second-best solution to achieve an efficient outcome.
The nature of the water industry is complex, so perhaps this
alternative approach will help policy-makers. “Every water basin,
urban area and household has a unique water fingerprint that reflects
the influence of local hydrology, cultural norms, history,
environmental constraints, political and economic structures, and
other institutional characteristics . . . . The causes of a water shortage
in Atlanta may differ from those of a shortage in Cairo, but their
solutions may share similarities.”227 Keeping this in mind, it is
important to recognize that the type and degree of transaction costs
will vary throughout the world. The following section provides the
benefits that accompany private-sector participation.
B. Does Private-Sector Involvement in the Delivery of the Right to
Water Yield an Efficient Economic Outcome?
Taking an alternative approach, it is also likely that encouraging
private-sector participation in the delivery of the right to water will
result in an efficient outcome. In fact, the notion that this scenario rises
to the level of Pareto superiority is further supported by the idea that
neither of the three parties is made worse off by this allocation of
resources. When an alteration can be made that makes at least one
person better off and no one worse off, this allocation of resources will
be an efficient outcome and Pareto superior. According to legal scholar
Gary Lawson, an efficient outcome of Pareto superiority represents a
“change or action . . . mak[ing] at least one person better off by his own
standards and no one worse off by her own standards.”228 The scenario
is the most socially, morally, and economically desired outcome.229 By
227. ZETLAND, supra note 19, at 23.
228. Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 85 (1992).
229. Id.
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recognizing efficient outcomes that are positive for all parties, the law
and economics approach may have broad applicability throughout the
realm of global hydrocommerce, particularly in the realm of
infrastructure development and access to water. Thus, even though the
prevailing transaction costs in reality limit the Coase Thereom’s
applicability under these circumstances, policy-makers can still benefit
from seeking to stimulate an economically efficient outcome.
1. Efficient Outcome for Individuals: The Indispensable
Element for Human Life
As recognized in the opening statement of General Comment No.
15, “[t]he human right to water is indispensable for leading a life in
human dignity. It is a prerequisite for the realization of other human
rights.”230 Based on this text alone, the benefits associated with the
access to right to water are clearly recognizable. From the individual’s
perspective, access to water has wide-reaching implications, which both
directly and indirectly relate to health, jobs, social rights, gender
equality, economics, and education, among other benefits. Thus,
providing citizens with access to water results in an efficient outcome
because it would make individuals better off. Social and economic
development are directly linked by the centrality and fundamental
nature of water.231 For individuals, water is directly related to all facets
of life, and “the effective access of citizens to safe water and sanitation
is crucial.”232
Providing access to water for individuals is the first step at
reducing many aspects of poverty in the developing world. Water
poverty results when people lack access to dependable quantities and
quality of water, or lack the capacity to use these water resources.
Water may be insufficient for basic human needs and food production,
while also influencing the availability of economic and ecosystem
services.233 The linkage between economic poverty and the lack of
water is well-established.234 Poverty is prevalent mostly in water-short
areas.235 The majority of those without sufficient drinking water and

230. General Comment No. 15, supra note 8, para. 1.
231. See generally Young, supra note 72, at 9–35.
232. Note, What price for the priceless?: Implementing the justiciability of the right to water,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1067 (2007), available at http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdfs/note.pdf.
233. See WARD et al., supra note 74, at 177–80.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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sanitation are in the more impoverished regions of the developing
world.236
Inadequate water supply and sanitation can have an enormous
impact on the health of individuals. The poor health of its citizens also
affect the entire economy of a country. The lack of water and sanitation
services is directly correlated to disease and sickness. Further,
individuals cannot work and contribute to the local or national
economy when they are sick or providing care for their sick family
members.237 Medical treatment also requires considerable
expenditures. When water is not provided in sufficient quality, this
unclean resource causes water-borne diseases such as diarrhea, among
other bacterial infections and diseases. In fact, after malaria and
respiratory infections, diarrhea is the third highest cause of child
mortality in West Africa.238
In the developing world, access to water may help limit the
prevalence of certain gender inequality issues.239 Women and children
must devote time to carrying or carting the water from its source when
the water is not available in the home. This disparity is primarily
inflicted upon the poorest of minorities.240 In East Africa, for instance,
more than a quarter of the total population resides in conditions where
each trip to collect water from its source takes over a half an hour.241
As a result, gender inequality issues become more entrenched because
this time-commitment erodes the capacity of women to engage in other
activities such as education or gainful employment.242 For children, the
responsibility for collecting water means they have fewer opportunities
to attend school, further decreasing their chances of escaping
poverty.243

236. Roberto Danino, Forward to SALMON & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, THE HUMAN RIGHT
TO WATER: LEGAL AND POLICY DIMENSIONS vii–vii (David Freestone and Salman M.A. Salman

eds.) (2004).
237. See generally Young, supra note 72, at 9–11.
238. See id.
239. SAVITRI BISNATH, MACROECONOMICS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO WATER AND
SANITATION (2011), Meeting Report at 10 (Center for Women’s Global Leadership 2011).
240. Id. (“Without specific attention to disadvantaged groups, often living in poorer regions,
government transfers could result in widening regional disparities and perpetuate
discrimination.”).
241. UNICEF,
Progress
on
Sanitation
and
Drinking-Water
(2010),
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/44272/1/9789241563956_eng.pdf
242. Young, supra note 72, at 3.
243. Id. at 10.
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Taking the Rioland hypothetical as an example, upon beginning
construction of the water infrastructure project, the benefits for
individuals will be vast. Immediately, many citizens of Rioland will
have the opportunity to seek employment that is directly related to the
project’s development. Rioland citizens will also benefit from the jobs
that come with managing and maintaining the water infrastructure
when construction is completed. Citizens will even benefit as the
country improves its economic potential by providing clean water and
adequate sanitation to all its citizens.
Therefore, encouraging private-sector participation in the
provision of the right to water may lead to an efficient outcome for
individuals. The wide-reaching benefits include economic growth and
jobs, as well as improvements in health, education, gender equality,
and food security.
2. Efficient Outcome for Countries: Precondition for Economic
Progress
In many countries, both in the developing and developed worlds,
there are vast benefits to be had from improvements in the water
infrastructure sector. By seeking private-sector participation, these
improvements will allow individuals to access their right to clean water
and adequate sanitation. In fact, early investments by states in the
“provision of these services appears to be a precondition for
progress,”244 particularly given the resulting economic, social,
environmental, and educational benefits, among many others. As the
population of certain states continues to increase, water constraints
and scarcity may negatively influence economic development,
especially in geographic regions where water is traditionally scarce.245
From a national perspective, access to clean water and education
are the most consistent predictors of economic progress.246 According
to researchers, “[d]irect benefits to society can be expected to flow
from both increased investment in the water supply and sanitation
sector, including investment in the conservation of ecosystems critical
for water.”247 The lack of water affects the well-being of individuals and
their quality of life, which in turn affects the State. This lack of clean
water, whether in quality or quantity, influences the State’s poverty

244.
245.
246.
247.

Id. at 35.
HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 9.
See generally Ward et al., supra note 74.
Young, supra note 72, at 35.
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levels and inability to escape poverty,248 food security, and the
proliferation of disease.249 Further, the availability of water for all
citizens may positively influence economic development, while also
reducing the State’s need to secure additional resources through
geopolitical conflicts or even wars.
In the case of our hypothetical Rioland, investments in water
infrastructure will have far-reaching positive benefits, directly and
indirectly benefitting the entire country, not just those individuals who
already have access to water. In the initial stages, the creation of jobs
may stimulate the economy. By reducing waste, this water can be
conserved for the environmental or utilized in the agricultural sector
to address food security issues. Over the long-term, having the
necessary infrastructure will aid economic growth and development.
Indirectly, providing access to water may lead to the development of
additional industries, allowing the country to look more attractive to
investors.
When a country seeks private-sector investments to pursue water
development projects, the country will experience health-related
benefits. According to a cost-benefits report by the World Health
Organization, and depending on location, the economic benefits of
each dollar invested in improved drinking water and sanitation ranges
from $3 to $34.250 This represents the benefits that arise from
preventing disease in the first place, rather than treating infections
after the fact. The adverse impacts of diseases from lack of access to
water and sanitation also have economic implications for countries. In
addition, the lack of access to water and sanitation leads to diseases
among the most vulnerable groups of citizens, both children and the
elderly population.251
The annual economic impacts from poor sanitation are
widespread. Alarmingly, Peter Gleick predicted in 2002 that “as many
as 76 million people will die by 2020 of preventable water-related
diseases.”252 The costs incurred by governments to address water-borne
diseases are substantial, resulting from inadequate water sanitation
services in places like Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and
248. HOFFMAN, supra note 104, at 9 (“[l]ack of water does not cause poverty, but poverty
virtually always includes a lack of water”).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 44–46.
251. SEGERFELDT, supra note 72, at 7–8.
252. Peter H. Gleick, DIRTY WATER: ESTIMATED DEATHS FROM WATER-RELATED
DISEASES 2000-2020, at 9 (2002), http://www.pacinst/org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/
water_related_deaths_report3.pdf.
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Vietnam, among others.253 These four countries lose a combined total
of $9 billion (USD) annually due to inadequate water sanitation, which
is approximately two percent of their combined GDP (based on 2005
figures).254 Lack of water and sanitation contributed to the cholera
epidemic suffered by Peru in 1991. This epidemic cost the government
over $1 billion in expenditures to control, treat, and prevent the spread
of the disease. If only a fraction of these costs (estimated $100 million
(USD)) had initially taken place to ensure the adequate provision of
water and sanitation, this severity of the epidemic likely would not
have occurred.255
Scientists acknowledge a correlation between threats to
biodiversity and ecosystems, with threats to water security.256 When the
threat to human water security is high, the threat to biodiversity is also
high.257 Adequate water infrastructure ensures that the water for
human, industrial, and agricultural consumption is not wasted. When
this water leaks in large quantities from the existing distribution
network, this water is not returned to the ecosystem. There are
significant opportunities for governments to protect natural
ecosystems and improve biodiversity outcomes by investing in water
infrastructure projects.258
Some economists suggest that investments in public infrastructure
can have significant effects that are positive for economic output and
economic growth.259 In terms of economic development, perhaps our
hypothetical Rioland could look to the nation of Turkey as an example.
In 2015, Turkey announced its $10 billion Southeastern Anatolia
Project (“GAP Project”), which covers the southeastern portion of
Turkey, the region that is located between the Euphrates and Tigris
Rivers.260 The GAP Project will improve Turkey’s irrigation, drinking
water infrastructure, and energy sectors (e.g., hydroelectric power
plants). In terms of benefits, the GAP Project is expected to improve

253. Within Indonesia alone, the annual economic impact of inadequate sanitation is
approximately $6.3 billion (USD). Young, supra note 72, at 9.
254. Young, supra note 72, at 3.
255. 2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 12, at 9–10.
256. Id. at 7.
257. Vorosmarty, supra note 77, at 556–61.
258. See id.
259. See generally Munnell, supra note 149, at 196 (discussing benefits proponents of
infrastructure investments argue).
260. Ali Unal, Turkey will invest $10 billion in southeastern Anatolia Project, DAILY SABAH,
Mar. 8, 2015, https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2015/03/08/turkey-will-invest-10-billion-insoutheastern-anatolia-project.
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the economy in many ways, including employment for over a million
people.261 According to the Prime Minister of Turkey, the five main
pillars of the project include economic growth, social development, city
planning, infrastructure development, and enhanced institutional
capacity.262
For developing countries, including Turkey, Rioland, and many
others, building adequate infrastructure helps transform the economy
and accelerates social development. For Turkey, this project will not
only reduce unemployment within the country, but will substantially
raise the region’s exports: “[m]acroeconomic policies affect the
operation of the economy as a whole, shaping the availability and
distribution of resources.”263
There are obvious questions with regards to financing the capitalintensive projects to fulfil the right to water. In particular, how will the
respective governments uphold its obligation to repay the private
sector investors, especially if the impoverished proportion of the
population cannot afford to purchase the right to access the water?
Because the General Comment ensures water for all, the answer to this
question involves examining instances of government creativity and
adaptability throughout the world. For example, in Durban, South
Africa, each citizen is entitled by law to six free kiloliters of water per
month.264 Citizens are then required to pay for any consumption
beyond this amount.265 In another example of government
resourcefulness, the Water Code of the Republic of Armenia provides
for financial assistance in two forms, either as subsidies for the poor
water users that cannot pay or as tax benefits to water suppliers.266
In Santiago, Chile, water vouchers are provided for families that
fall below the poverty line to pay their water bills.267 Although an
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. SAVITRI BISNATH, MACROECONOMICS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO WATER AND
SANITATION (2011), Meeting Report at 7 (Center for Women’s Global Leadership 2011).
“Macroeconomic policy refers to fiscal (public revenue and public expenditure) and monetary
policies (including policies on interest and exchange rates and the money supply), which impact
on the economy and living standards, including the levels of employment and growth and the
prices and availability of basic social services, such as water and sanitation.” Id.
264. SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 71.
265. See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 71, n. 262, 298 (discussing
Manquele v. Durban Transitional Metropolitan, Council Case, South Africa No. 2036/2000).
266. See SALMAN & MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, supra note 14, at 72, n. 264 (noting that the
provision was adopted by Armenia on June 4, 2002, with the intention of ensuring equal
conditions for all and avoiding discrimination in the supply of water).
267. Id. at 71–72.
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apparent contradiction existed as the government subsidized water to
the poor, while requiring the water utility to function as a commercial
entity, the outcome was indicative of economic efficiency. In fact, the
following quote depicts a Pareto optimal scenario, whereby both
parties were made better, without either becoming worse off: “[t]he
utility then not only strengthened its focus…but now had clear
incentive to serve the poor, who became revenue-generating customers
like all others. The system works well.”268 It could be argued that the
government was made worse off because it was temporarily burdened
by the payment. However, this notion is refuted by the fact that the
government achieved its objective (i.e., providing all citizens with their
right to water), and by recognizing the long-term benefits for the
country through improved health and reduced chances for water-borne
disease (i.e., less healthcare costs for the government).
Tariffs and costs to pay for these infrastructure projects may be
viewed in an unfavorable light initially because citizens will generally
prefer to pay less. However, if governments can have the foresight to
see beyond this likely temporary resistance during the interim, the
long-term benefit will be abundantly positive, as citizens begin to
recognize the benefits of preventing waste and using less quantities of
this essential resource. These infrastructure projects will indirectly
benefit water conservation.269 When a price is attached, governments
are forced to be more mindful of how much they are using across the
country, not just the price of water but the price for the
infrastructure.270
Therefore, encouraging private-sector participation in the
provision of the right to water may lead to an efficient outcome for
individuals. The wide-reaching benefits include economic growth and
reduced unemployment rates, as well as a healthier and more educated
population.
3. Efficient Outcome for Private-Sector Investors: “Blue Gold”
& Wealth Maximization
The efficient outcome for private sector investors is the most
clearly identifiable of all the parties. As mentioned above, many
corporations and investors will likely experience an abundance of
268. Id. at 72, n. 263 (citing World Water Vision (Commission Report), A Water Secure
World: Vision for Water, Life, and the Environment 36, WORLD WATER COUNCIL (2006)).
269. See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873,
1882 (2005) (discussing government rules and regulations as incentives for water conservation).
270. Id. at 1883.
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profits from many facets of the water industry. Although wealth
maximization is the primary motivation that makes this party better
off, the fact that private investors are helping provide the human right
to water may look good to shareholders, particularly as we enter an era
of corporate sustainability.
Investors must contend with numerous risks and transaction costs
in the realm of water resources, including insufficient economic data,
opaque management, and stakeholders being inadequately linked.
According to a 2030 Water Resources Group publication, “water
resources face inefficient allocation and poor investment patterns
because investors lack a consistent basis for economically rational
decision-making.”271 As demand for water grows in emerging markets,
the inefficiency among the current water distribution schemes will be
inadequate to ensure the provision of water. These same emerging
markets present many opportunities for private-sector participation.
As the right to water becomes a justiciable obligation for
countries, perhaps this may trigger the increased participation of
private-sector investors, as many of these countries could otherwise not
finance these large-scale infrastructure projects. Because the
individuals, states, and private-sector are each made better off, the
preceding analysis suggests that private-sector participation in water
distribution is an allocation of resources that is likely Pareto optimal,
thus achieving an efficient equilibrium.
VI. SHIFTING PERSPECTIVES: THE WATER JUSTICE MOVEMENT’S
CONDEMNATION OF PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTICIPATION
Scenarios that invite private-sector involvement within the
delivery of the right to water are representative of efficient outcomes,
and thus align with the Coase Theorem. In a general sense, the Coase
Theorem provides that when transaction costs are zero, such as when
any agreement that is in the mutual benefit of the parties concerned
gets made, then any initial definition of property rights leads to an
efficient outcome.272 Agreements between governments and investors
from the private sector, as explained above, are mutually beneficial to
each party. These agreements between governments and investors also
provide an efficient platform to achieve zero transaction costs.
Countries and individuals both benefit because the governments will
be better suited to provide their citizens with water, the fundamental

271. 2030 WATER RESOURCES GROUP, supra note 12, at 4.
272. See generally Friedman, Swedes Get it Right, supra note 45.
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necessity to all aspects of life. Private-sector investors benefit through
the pursuit of global profits within the lucrative hydrocommerce
industry. The main distinction is that the Coase Theorem addressed
property rights, rather than human rights, as in the right to water.
Although this distinction has sparked debate, a thorough Coasian
analysis supports the notion that an efficient economic outcome can be
achieved through cooperation between governments and the private
sector, at least in the delivery of the human right to water.
Nevertheless, closer examination of the property rights described
in The Problem of Social Cost resembles the human right to water
regime, at least within the context of the relationship between privatesector involvement and this right to water. Coase’s analysis is similar
to this Article because it relies upon a mosaic of rights among various
parties “to carry out a circumscribed list of actions.”273 For instance, the
landowner does not possess unlimited rights. The landowner may not
have the right to build certain structures or grow certain crops on his
land. Other parties may even have rights to use or cross the land. As
Coase reasons, “[t]he cost of exercising a right…is always the loss
which is suffered elsewhere in consequence of the exercise of that
right” such that the most desirable social arrangements prompt results
where “what was gained was worth more than what was lost.”274
Based on the Coasian premise that rights are not unlimited,
individuals have the right to access water but neither these individuals
nor their governments possess the right to exclude the corresponding
rights of the private sector to participate in the delivery of the right to
water. Individuals, governments, and the private sector each possess
distinct, yet interconnected rights within the water industry.
Recognition of these rights may lead to the most economically efficient
outcome because minimal costs will be associated with the exercise of
these rights. Much more will be gained than what is lost: individuals
receive a fundamental necessity of life, governments benefit from
increased health within their country, and corporations obtain
significant profits within the water industry.275 In terms of water
markets, noted scholar Robert Glennon explains the relationship
between rights and efficiency:
An ability to transfer ownership creates an
incentive to use property more productively. This is the
core idea of markets. Owners of property assess the
273. See generally Coase, Social Cost, supra note 3.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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value of it to them and part with it if they will realize a
profit. Buyers seek to change the use of property and
capture the value added by the new use. In this process,
both sellers and buyers make profits, and society
benefits from increased efficiency.276
But what happens when governments cannot fulfill this obligation
to deliver water and provide this basic necessity of life to its citizens?
The more than two billion people that lack access to clean water are
proof that governments, in their sole capacity, are not equipped with
the resources and capital necessary to deliver this obligation. As one
commentator says, “Given the capital failure of the public sector to
supply poor people with clean water, the positions and actions of antiprivatization activists are hard to understand”, concluding that the
water justice activists “are driven by an ideologically inspired aversion
to enterprise.”277
These activists who oppose corporate participation in the global
water industry also acknowledge this alarming statistic, but argue that
the predominant roadblock to governmental failure to provide clean
water is because “they are burdened by their debt to the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund.”278 While this may be true to a
limited extent, the underlying reality remains the same: governments
are failing to fulfill their obligation to deliver water to its citizens. It is
here that the pragmatic argument in favor of private-sector
involvement begins to flow cohesively within the economic currents of
the Coase Theorem. Perhaps a shift in baseline perspectives—very
much akin to the “change of approach” suggested by Coase279—to
those perspectives that embrace an economic analysis by encompassing
all relevant factors, will begin to facilitate the reconciliation between
water justice activists and private-sector investors within the arena of
global hydrocommerce.
In Blue Covenant, water justice activist Maude Barlow levied
harsh criticism aimed at private-sector involvement in the human right
to water.
Barlow does not completely reject private-sector

276. Glennon, supra note 75, at 1887.
277. Segerfeldt, supra note 74, at 4 (explaining that these anti-privatization groups also have
a profound suspicion of the market economy and business enterprise in general, as well as belief
in the “superior ability” of the public sector to deliver the needs of citizens).
278. BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 159.
279. Coase, supra note 3, at 42 (suggesting that a change in approach to welfare economics is
necessary to ensure economists arrive at correct conclusions about “the treatment of harmful
effects”).
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participation as an absolute;280 The overarching sentiment is that the
human right to water should be void of corporate investments.281
“Private transnational corporations cannot maintain a competitive
position in the water industry if they operate on the principles of water
conservation, water justice and water democracy.”282 Instead, Barlow
suggests that the better scenario is one in which “[o]nly governments,
with their mandate to work in the public good, can operate on these
principles.”283 Within a Coasian analysis context, the arguments against
private-sector involvement in the right to water seemingly
“concentrate[ ] attention on particular deficiencies,”284 such that the
water justice movement’s disparagement of corporate participation
may theoretically “nourish the belief that any measure which will
remove the deficiency is necessarily desirable.”285
The alleged “deficiency,” at least according to water justice
activists, is that profit-driven corporations will inevitably disrupt the
right to water.286 But the reality, which water justice activists often
overlook, is that many governments cannot fulfill their obligation to
deliver this particular human right to its citizens. In Coasian terms, if
the “corrective measure” is to prevent private-sector investment in the
water industry, Barlow’s argument may divert attention from other
changes associated with sole reliance on the government to deliver
water to its citizens.287 The realities stemming from these other changes
are that the right to water is either delivered inefficiently or not at all—
”changes which may well produce more harm than the original
deficiency.”288 Legal scholars tend to agree, although indirectly, with
the pragmatic undercurrents of the Coasian approach: “From a human
rights perspective, the important question is not whether a private

280. BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 161. Despite the anti-corporation sentiment expressed
throughout the book, Barlow does somewhat qualify the criticism as not being an absolute. “That
is not to say there is no role for the private sector in finding solutions to the global water crisis.
But all private sector activity must come under strict public oversight and government
accountability, and all would have to operate within a program whose goals are conservation and
water justice.” Id.
281. See generally id.
282. Id. at 162.
283. Id. at 162.
284. Coase, supra note 3, at 42.
285. Coase, supra note 3, at 42–43.
286. BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 161-62. “The creation of a worldwide water cartel is wrong
ethically, environmentally and socially and ensures that decisions regarding the allocation of
water are made based on commercial, not environmental or social, concerns.”
287. Id.
288. Coase, supra note 3, at 43.
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sector entity is involved in the delivery of services, but how the
arrangement is structured, implemented, and monitored.”289
Coase qualified the scope of his analysis in The Problem of Social
Cost, suggesting that his comparisons were confined to the value of
production. Although his analysis may have been limited in that sense,
Coase reasoned that choices between different solutions should be
examined in “broader terms,” such that the “total effect of these
arrangements in all spheres of life should be taken into account.”290
Nevertheless, Barlow’s argument is not one that considers whether
varying degrees of private-sector involvement could be acceptable. She
suggests that corporate participation in the water industry is
“criminal,” a scenario in which corporations “impos[e] a new form of
colonial conquest dressed up as the one and only economic model
available.”291 These water justice activists point to examples of failed
private-sector participation in Cochabamba, Bolivia292 and KwazuleNatal, South Africa,293 as reasons to suggest that water corporations
“should be forced to leave poor countries.”294 Because this diverts
attention to these unsuccessful examples, it is important to reconsider
whether or not the failed ventures were necessarily the result of
private-sector investment per se or instead rooted in bespoke
occurrences that could not be resolved. Thus, the argument against
private-sector participation does not embrace the “totality of
circumstances,” at least not within the broader economic context that
Coase preferred.
Relying entirely on government regulation or oversight may lead
to ineffective outcomes because the “government is attempting to do
too much,” such that the public sector “has reached the stage at which,
for many of its activities, as economists would say, the marginal product
is negative.”295 Rather than admonishing the potential effects of
289. Sharmila L. Murthy, The Human Right(s) to Water and Sanitation: History, Meaning,
and the Controversy Over-Privatization, 31 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89,
90 (2013).
290. Coase, supra note 3, at 42–44.
291. BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 160.
292. See Kapoor supra note 90, at 163. See also OSCAR OLIVERA & TOM LEWIS,
COCHABAMBA: WATER WAR IN BOLIVIA (2004) (describing shortcomings of water privatization
in Cochabamba); Willem Assies, David versus Goliath in Cochabamba: Water Rights,
Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia, 30 LATIN AM. PERSP. 14, 30 (2003).
293. See generally Kapoor, supra note 90, at 177. See also Jacques Pauw, The Politics of
Underdevelopment: Metered to Death – How a Water Experiment Caused Riots and a Cholera
Epidemic, 33 INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 819 (2003).
294. BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 160.
295. R.H. Coase, Economists and Public Policy, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND
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corporate participation as Barlow suggests,296 should we instead
examine what private-sector involvement can do? The global water
challenges are much too vast to completely ostracize an entire sector.
The shortfalls that permeate Barlow’s water justice argument are
similar to the inadequacies within the Pigouvian tradition that Coase
demonstrated. The policy conclusions of both Barlow and Pigou are
“the result of not comparing the total product obtainable with
alternative social arrangements.”297
For example, Coase criticized the scenario in which regulations
(such as zoning regulations or a Pigouvian tax) would force smokeproducing factories to be removed from areas where the smoke causes
harmful effects. These measures would result in reduced production,
an outcome that should be weighed against the harm if the factory
remained. In comparison, Barlow’s suggestion to eliminate privatesector involvement may reduce the potential for corporate failure (or
harm), but this certainly would not improve the abilities of
governments to provide the right to water. The significant harm that
would arise by not permitting private-sector participation and
governments subsequently not fulfilling their obligation to deliver the
right to water would be a disastrous outcome that should be weighed
against the random harm that could result from corporate involvement
on occasion. As Coase might say, the aim of such policy considerations
“should not be to eliminate” externalities such as smoke pollution and
intermittent corporate harm, “but rather to secure the optimum
amount” of smoke-emitting factories and participation by the private
sector in delivering the right to water, thereby ensuring the “amount
which will maximise the value of production.”298
VII. CONCLUSION
To meet all competing demands and achieve economic efficiency,
in light of existing market dynamics, there must be a concerted effort
among stakeholders to adopt a holistic resource view that
acknowledges water as the key input for economic development, social
and cultural growth, and environmental conservation. As shown by the
nearly two billion people around the world lacking access to clean
water, governments are currently falling short of their obligation to
provide the human right to water. Governments should therefore be
ECONOMISTS 34, 62 (The University of Chicago Press 1994).
296. BARLOW, BLUE COVENANT 101.
297. Coase, supra note 3, at 39–40.
298. Coase, supra note 3, at 42.
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encouraged to seek private-sector investors to successfully provide
their citizens with water. Many of these developments will be in the
form of water infrastructure projects, involving three main parties. The
allocation of resources among these parties, including citizens,
countries, and private-sector investors, may be an efficient outcome,
even despite the existence of transaction costs.

